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Thread: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

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    United States Avalon Member onevoice's Avatar
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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Ron Mauer Sr (here)
    Software development for aviation must be tested and verified in compliance with DO-178. The FAA must approve the facility developing the software. Verification should be vigorous by actual testing when possible or by code inspections (not preferred). An update to software has the potential to crash the system dependent upon how robust the software has been designed.

    As a Software Quality Assurance Engineer, for two different manufacturers, I have witnessed the pressure for shipping incompletely tested software many times, although no mission critical problems were known.

    Management wanted me to be an insulator for them. They did not want to be accountable if something went wrong. Yet management would sometimes authorize shipment because the software had to be installed before a ship left port.

    Comments I've heard in team meetings by Program Managers:
    "Ship the software anyway and let the customer pay to fix the problems."
    "If you do not sign approval you will force the engineers to work through the Christmas holidays."
    "You are not a team player."

    It was a stressful job. Walking back to my desk, I asked myself a question. "Why have I chosen this experience?"

    Immediately I heard an inner voice, "To learn how to deal with powerful people."

    If there are any Quality Assurance people here, always keep good records. Sometimes the best one can do is put "Approved pending resolution of identified issues." The Quality Assurance role is to identify and report problems. Only management can authorize expenditures to fix the problems. Quality Assurance cannot fix the problems.
    OK I am off my soap box. Sometimes the unpleasant memories surface.

    I expect this kind of a problem is almost everywhere.
    Hey, Ron Mauer Sr, it seems we shared common career track. My first two professional roles as a Software Engineer was Independent Verification and Validation agent to monitor and provide overall quality review of various programs at Lockheed (before it merged to become Lockheed Martin). Few years after that job, I joined Lockheed to become Software Quality Assurance Engineer. My job was to participate in software review of various software modules that were being developed for the Navy for their Track and Control part of the Cruise Missiles systems that were deployed on all the USS Iowa class battleships, such as USS Iowa, USS New Jersey, etc.

    Working as a civilian contractor for the military, we were never rushed for schedule. We always had the proper time to make any necessary reviews. In my first career position as IV&V, I was able to see overall program perspective as the program went through its various lifecycles.

    Since I knew how to read the software listing, there were a few times I pointed out software errors I caught, but most of my inputs dealt with ensuring that the software developer adhered to the required military software development standards. Later on, I developed software to analyze the program software developer's code and provide reports that analyzed the complexity of logic implemented in a software module as well as few aspects of applicable military software development standards. Since there were thousands of software modules to review and we didn't have time to review every module, the logic complexity analyzer I wrote helped my department to focus our efforts on reviewing the software that implemented the most complex logic structures.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Brand new Boeing plane literally falls apart over Rome: Engine fails, breaks off and rains debris on people, homes and vehicles

    RT
    Mon, 12 Aug 2019 14:29 UTC


    © Il Messaggero

    A Norwegian Air Boeing 787 plane was forced to turn around in Rome and make an emergency landing after engine failure caused hundreds of fragments to rain down on vehicles, homes and people below.

    One person, 25 vehicles and 12 houses were struck by fragments falling from the Dreamliner flight DY-7115 from Rome to Los Angeles. Pilots declared an emergency when it suffered single-engine failure at 3,000 feet shortly after takeoff on Saturday, and returned to Rome's Fiumicino Airport 23 minutes after departure with 310 passengers and crew on board. There were no reported injuries.

    However, eyewitness reports of hundreds of pieces of hot debris raining down on the area surrounding the airport soon emerged. Images of smashed windscreens, damaged roofs and other objects in people's gardens were shared online. One person received mild burns from the falling pieces, according to Italian media.


    © Flight24

    Quote Esterino Montino
    on Saturday
    Intorno alle 16.40 di oggi un aereo in decollo dall'aeroporto Leonardo da Vinci ha avuto un'avaria ed è dovuto rientrare. Durante l'avaria, però, ha perso dei pezzi metallici che sono caduti a grande velocità al suolo, all'altezza di via Mariotti a Isola Sacra.
    Cadendo, questi frammenti hanno colpito macchine in sosta, tende da giardino e altri oggetti, danneggiandoli.
    Sul posto si sono recati gli agenti della Polizia Locale, della Polizia di Stato, dei Carabinieri, i Vigili ...
    See More





    Passengers on board the flight told La Repubblica that "worrying noises" came from the engine 10 minutes after takeoff and, upon landing, the plane's tires were also burst.

    The incident could have had potentially disastrous and fatal consequences if the plane had continued for "a few more moments," when it would have reached the center of town "or the crowded beaches of the Roman coast," reported Corriere Della Sela.

    Passengers criticized the low-budget Oslo-based airline for failing to provide information following the incident, and for leaving hundreds "abandoned" at the Rome airport without their luggage.

    Italy's aviation safety agency (ANSV) has launched an investigation into the five-year-old Boeing 787-8 plane and it's Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engine, to determine what caused such a dangerous malfunction.

    "La réalité est un rêve que l'on fait atterrir" San Antonio AKA F. Dard

    Troll-hood motto: Never, ever, however, whatsoever, to anyone, a point concede.

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    United States Avalon Member onevoice's Avatar
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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Here is a recent news update regarding the Boeing 737 MAX 8 saga. It's likely that this plane won't fly again until well into next year. Also other nation's aviation regulators want to ensure flight simulator training for all 737 MAX 8 pilots, which FAA seems to be hesitant to mandate.

    Wall Street Journal link
    Indonesia to Fault 737 MAX Design, U.S. Oversight in Lion Air Crash Report
    First formal government finding on crash also likely to detail pilot and maintenance missteps; NTSB preparing separate safety recommendations

    Indonesian officials have found design and oversight lapses played a central role in October’s Lion Air crash. Above, wreckage from Lion Air flight JT610, Karawang, Nov. 3, 2018. PHOTO: ANTARA FOTO/JAYA KUSUMA/REUTERS

    By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
    Sept. 22, 2019 4:54 pm ET

    Indonesian investigators have determined that design and oversight lapses played a central role in the fatal crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet in October, according to people familiar with the matter, in what is expected to be the first formal government finding of fault.

    The draft conclusions, these people said, also identify a string of pilot errors and maintenance mistakes as causal factors in the fatal plunge of the Boeing Co. plane into the Java Sea, echoing a preliminary report from Indonesia last year.

    Misfires of an automated flight-control feature called MCAS on the MAX fleet led to the nosedive of the Lion Air jet and a similar crash of an Ethiopian Airlines MAX shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa in March. The two crashes took 346 lives, prompted the grounding of all 737 MAX planes and disrupted the global aviation industry.

    Details of the Indonesian report, which haven’t been reported previously, are subject to change and further analysis. Indonesian investigators declined to comment, except to say the final document is likely to come out in early November.
    A Boeing spokesman said the plane maker continues to work with Indonesian authorities as they complete the report.

    U.S. air-crash investigators are preparing to make public a handful of separate safety recommendations, ranging from bolstering the manual flying skills of pilots to enhancing FAA vetting of new aircraft designs.

    The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is expected around the end of the month to call for improvements to cockpit training and crew decision making, according to industry and government officials.

    The goal is to ensure pilot proficiency when automated systems are malfunctioning or turned off, to help ensure appropriate responses to contradictory cockpit warnings such as those that occurred prior to the MAX crashes, the officials said. The board also is expected to emphasize the importance of setting priorities when executing emergency checklists.

    In addition, the NTSB is expected to focus on potential changes to the certification of new airliners. The board is poised to recommend re-evaluation of FAA procedures that give the industry authority to sign off on certain safety matters, the officials said. The aim is to make such approvals more transparent, with the goal of greater predictability and more-consistent federal oversight across various types of onboard systems.

    Neither the U.S. nor Indonesian recommendations will be binding on the FAA, though the agency already faces escalating congressional and public pressure to change certification procedures. More than half a dozen outside inquiries, including a Justice Department criminal probe and various blue-ribbon advisory panels, are delving into the FAA’s 2017 approval of MCAS. Earlier this month, a Senate appropriations subcommittee backed legislation that would require FAA officials to address recommendations from ongoing investigations and audits.
    The FAA has said it welcomes the independent reviews, will carefully consider their results and doesn’t have a firm timetable for allowing MAX jets back in the air. Boeing has said it is collaborating with U.S. and foreign officials to safely return the MAX to service.

    Steve Dickson, the FAA’s new head, and top lieutenants are scheduled to meet Monday in Montreal with some four dozen foreign regulators to provide a closed-door update on anticipated fixes to the MAX’s flight-control software and computers.


    The crashes prompted the grounding of all 737 MAX planes and disrupted the global aviation industry. PHOTO: LINDSEY WASSON/REUTERS

    The FAA is urging a core group of regulators—from Canada, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand—to approve the fixes around November, which would be roughly in tandem with informal U.S. timelines. FAA leaders also are trying to persuade aviation authorities in Europe and other regions to follow by lifting their grounding orders shortly afterward, according to U.S. government and industry officials familiar with the deliberations.

    But such coordination efforts are running into significant hurdles. Canadian aviation regulators have signaled to the FAA that they expect to require pilots to undergo simulator training before they can start flying the MAX, something the FAA is unlikely to mandate. It could take until March for Air Canada to phase the bulk of its MAX aircraft into regular schedules, according to a person briefed on the details, months later than projected for U.S. operators.

    In Europe, regulators previously said they won’t accept the FAA’s technical verifications of fixes and intend to perform their own certification analyses, possibly adding weeks or months to the timetable.

    Meanwhile, FAA officials said in recent weeks that Boeing hasn’t provided all of the requested details laying out the description and safety assessments of the MAX’s redesigned flight-control system.

    The latest version of Indonesia’s accident report has been shared with the FAA and NTSB for comment. U.S. officials are expected to visit Indonesia around the end of this month to finalize the document. People familiar with the process said NTSB experts don’t appear to have major disagreements with the draft. Boeing and the FAA, on the other hand, are concerned the final report will unduly emphasize design and FAA certification missteps, some of these people said.

    Unlike NTSB reports that identify the primary cause of accidents and then list contributing issues determined to be less significant, Indonesia is following a convention used by many foreign regulators of listing causal factors without ranking them. Instead, the report is expected to list more than 100 elements of the crash chronology, according to a person briefed on the details. Many of those points are likely to refer to missteps by pilots and mechanics initially revealed last year in Indonesia’s preliminary report.

    Indonesian authorities now are asking for comments on the draft conclusions dealing with those missteps, as well as findings that investigators have determined constitute engineering shortcomings, including reliance on a sole sensor in the original design of MCAS, according to people familiar with the matter.

    Kim Mackrael
    and Ben Otto contributed to this article
    .

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by onevoice (here)
    missteps
    Jeez, what a diluted euphemism.

    'Missteps' = catastrophic lack of understanding by the pilots what the **** was going on, due to their being almost totally unaware of MCAS having never been briefed or trained on it.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Bill Ryan (here)
    Quote Posted by onevoice (here)
    missteps
    Jeez, what a diluted euphemism.

    'Missteps' = catastrophic lack of understanding by the pilots what the **** was going on, due to their being almost totally unaware of MCAS having never been briefed or trained on it.
    Those at the top of Boeing and the industry are scapegoating maintenance and pilots for "missteps" when they were never given the steps to miss in the first place.

    As I understand it, the problem with this plane, that they tried to fix with a computer system that overrides pilots in the cockpit, is that the engines on the plane are too large and touch the ground on the 737 Max. So, they moved the engines forward and up on the wings. This created air dynamic, flight and stability problems that they tried to compensate for with computer and related software and hardware. But, they did not educate and train, or at least not adequately educate and train, pilots, maintenance etc...

    This plane is unsafe at any altitude.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Ron Mauer Sr (here)
    Comments I've heard in team meetings by Program Managers:

    "Ship the software anyway and let the customer pay to fix the problems."
    "If you do not sign approval you will force the engineers to work through the Christmas holidays."
    "You are not a team player."
    I really value this type of whistleblowing were one discovers the treacherous nature of big and small programmers behind the ever more digitalized world. This socalled 4th industrial revolution is bringing out the worst in human characters.

    And about the true concern that pilots don't understand their computerized planes any longer, I heard yesterday that after the catastrophe in 2009 with the Air France flight Rio de Janeiro - Paris pilots were put thru a training program with Microlights (ULM in french) to get a better sense of what flying really is. That tells a lot and they know.
    Last edited by Bill Ryan; 25th September 2019 at 19:34. Reason: fixed quote formatting

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Satori (here)
    Quote Posted by Bill Ryan (here)
    Quote Posted by onevoice (here)
    missteps
    Jeez, what a diluted euphemism.

    'Missteps' = catastrophic lack of understanding by the pilots what the **** was going on, due to their being almost totally unaware of MCAS having never been briefed or trained on it.
    Those at the top of Boeing and the industry are scapegoating maintenance and pilots for "missteps" when they were never given the steps to miss in the first place.

    As I understand it, the problem with this plane, that they tried to fix with a computer system that overrides pilots in the cockpit, is that the engines on the plane are too large and touch the ground on the 737 Max. So, they moved the engines forward and up on the wings. This created air dynamic, flight and stability problems that they tried to compensate for with computer and related software and hardware. But, they did not educate and train, or at least not adequately educate and train, pilots, maintenance etc...

    This plane is unsafe at any altitude.
    There is an attempt to blame the pilots -- fortunately the NTSB disagrees with that view. According to the article, an erroneous AOA sensor (which measures the flight attitude (ascending, descending, hovering) causes a cascade of alarms in the cockpit, but the pilots has to recognise the problem and respond within an impossibly short 10 seconds, while dealing with sudden information overload.

    Please note the snippet highlighted in red below:

    Quote A recent New York Times Magazine piece by one William Langewiesche blamed the pilots for the crash of two 737 MAX airplanes. We strongly criticized that Boeing friendly propaganda piece:
    The author's "blame the pilots" attitude is well expressed in this paragraph:
    Critics have since loudly blamed it for the difficulty in countering the MCAS when the system receives false indications of a stall. But the truth is that the MCAS is easy to counter — just flip the famous switches to kill it.
    --- snip ---

    Last week the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) released 13 pages long recommendation (pdf) resulting from its investigation into the 737 MAX incidents. It strongly supports our view and counters Langewiesche's claims:
    [T]he MCAS becomes active when the airplane’s AOA exceeds a certain threshold. Thus, these erroneous AOA sensor inputs resulted in the MCAS activating on the accident flights and providing the automatic AND stabilizer trim inputs. The erroneous high AOA sensor input that caused the MCAS activation also caused several other alerts and indications for the flight crews. The stick shaker activated on both accident flights and the previous Lion Air flight. In addition, IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE alerts occurred on all three flights. Also, the Ethiopian Airlines flight crew received Master Caution alert. Further, after the flaps were fully retracted, the unintended AND stabilizer inputs required the pilots to apply additional force to the columns to maintain the airplane’s climb attitude.

    Multiple alerts and indications can increase pilots’ workload, and the combination of the alerts and indications did not trigger the accident pilots to immediately perform the runaway stabilizer procedure during the initial automatic AND stabilizer trim input.
    --- snip ---

    The NTSB recommends that Boeing and other manufacturers make new system safety assessments that consider the effects of all possible flight deck alarms and indications on the pilots reaction time when they respond to the failure of flight control systems. It asks for design changes of the alarm systems and for additional training. The NTSB recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration and other regulators include those demands into their general rules for aircraft certification.

    The NTSB recommendations will likely induce the FAA to require additional changes on the currently grounded 737 MAX. They also seem to to push the FAA to require additional pilot training.

    The NTSB report is bad news for Boeing. Most competing airplanes are much newer than the 737 and have multiple electronic sensors that can be easily combined to sort through and prioritize alarms. The 737 MAX is still largely based on the old mechanical and electrical systems of its predecessors. That makes it difficult to add a system that coordinates and prioritizes the cascade of alarms that can happen during certain events. The required changes will come on top of other changes that international regulators have loudly demanded.
    https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/0...e-737-max.html

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    It gets even worse:

    Quote Earlier Versions Of Boeing's MCAS Included Crucial Safeguards That Were Kept Off The 737 MAX

    Engineers working on Boeing's 737 MAX flight control system left out key safeguards that were included on an earlier version of the same system used on a military tanker jet, according to the Wall Street Journal.

    The MCAS system in question has been determined by investigators to have been the cause of two deadly 737 MAX crashes that killed a total of 346 people. Investigators have implicated the MCAS system in the Lion Air jet crash of October 2018 and of an Ethiopian Airlines jet in March of this year. MCAS stands for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.

    The engineers responsible for creating MCAS more than a decade ago for the military tanker jet designed the system "to rely on inputs from multiple sensors and with limited power to move the tanker’s nose". This design was to include "deliberate checks" against the system acting in error.

    A person familiar with the matter said:
    “It was a choice. You don’t want the solution to be worse than the initial problem.”
    -- snip --
    https://www.zerohedge.com/technology...e-kept-737-max

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Here is the latest article on the Boeing 737-MAX. There has been friction developing between the FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The fundamental difference is EASA wants to run both MAX flight control computers simultaneously -- currently they are being run separately on alternating flights, as well as insisting on additional testing than what FAA has planned on proposed revisions to flight-control computers. I hope the EASA's plan prevails over the FAA's plan since it is a safer plan.

    https://www.wsj.com/articles/frictio...d=hp_lead_pos6

    Friction Between U.S., European Regulators Could Delay 737 MAX Return to Service
    European air-safety regulator has indicated it wants more testing on proposed revisions to flight-control computers

    The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told U.S. regulators it wasn’t satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions. PHOTO: LINDSEY WASSON/REUTERS

    By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
    Updated Oct. 8, 2019 3:46 pm ET

    Boeing Co. BA -0.65% ’s delay-prone effort to return 737 MAX jets to service has hit a new snag due to heightened European safety concerns about proposed fixes to the aircraft’s flight-control system, according to people familiar with the details.

    Disagreements over various software details, centered on how the MAX’s dual flight-control computers are now intended to operate simultaneously, haven’t been reported before. The issue could prolong final vetting of the anticipated changes and may prompt European regulators to withhold their full support when the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration ultimately allows the planes back in the air, these people said.

    The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told senior U.S. regulators it wasn’t satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions.

    The aim of the change is to add redundancy by running both computers at the same time, in particular to eliminate hazards stemming from possible chip malfunctions identified months ago. Over decades, and on previous versions of the 737, only one computer at a time has fed an array of data to automated systems, alternating between flights.

    The European concerns were passed on by EU aviation-safety chief Patrick Ky to Ali Bahrami, the FAA’s top safety official, one of the people said. EASA, as the European safety agency is known, said it hadn’t reached a verdict on Boeing’s fixes or whether it will act in tandem with the FAA.

    Without a swift resolution, according to those briefed on the details, EASA’s objections could set an aviation-industry precedent for foreign authorities publicly second-guessing determinations by the FAA that an aircraft was safe to fly.

    Boeing and the FAA are finishing testing the dual-computer system, and the final results haven’t been presented to EASA or other regulators. EASA has signaled, though, that it wants additional risk scenarios examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person said.

    The situation remains fluid, and EASA’s position could change. The agency previously indicated it planned to perform some of its own simulator testing and risk analysis in coordination with FAA activities. But now, according to people briefed on the latest friction, European regulators appear poised to diverge from the overall U.S. game plan unless a compromise is reached in coming weeks. Boeing engineers are frustrated that EASA hasn’t specified what additional measures might allay its worries, according to people close to the discussions.

    Regulators are mandating safeguards for the MAX’s flight-control features following a pair of fatal accidents that took 346 lives. The aircraft have been grounded world-wide since shortly after the second crash, in March.

    On Monday an EASA spokeswoman said the agency still is assessing the proposed software changes, but she disputed the notion that European regulators are balking at clearing the planes for service simultaneously with the U.S., Canada and Brazil. “At this stage,” she said in an email, “we do not have any specific concerns that would lead to the conclusion” that EASA is avoiding a coordinated response with the FAA. She declined to comment on any conversations between Mr. Ky and senior FAA officials.

    Addressing a meeting of foreign regulators in Montreal last month, FAA chief Steve Dickson promised to provide U.S. assistance and to pass along lessons learned “as you make your own decisions about returning the MAX to service.”

    Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee afterward, Daniel Elwell, the FAA’s No. 2 official, appeared to open the door to the possibility that the jets might return in stages, by region. Mr. Elwell said that “while simultaneous ungrounding, when or if that happens, is desired, it’s not obligatory.”

    A Boeing spokesman said: “We continue to work with regulators on addressing their concerns and working through the process for certifying the 737 MAX software and training updates and safely returning the airplane to service.”

    Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said last week that Boeing test pilots had completed more than 700 MAX flights. “We are very confident in that software solution, and we are now just marching through the final steps on certifying that, so that everybody’s confident in the safety of the airplane,” he said in a public appearance in New York.

    Over the past months, Boeing, EASA and the FAA have basically agreed on related software revisions designed to scale back the power, and reduce the likelihood of a misfire, of an automated flight-control system called MCAS that was central to the two MAX jet accidents, happening within less than five months.

    Lately, the Chicago-based plane maker has been signaling it expects the FAA to formally lift the grounding in November or December, which would put the bulk of the U.S. MAX fleet on track to begin carrying passengers early next year. It previously said it expected that FAA action early in the fourth quarter. But the company hasn’t yet turned over to the FAA the final package of software fixes. That is expected to be followed by several weeks of FAA analysis, flight tests and determination of pilot training requirements.

    The FAA has said it is methodically verifying the safety of proposed fixes but doesn’t have a predetermined timeline for a decision.

    EASA’s leaders also want commitments from Boeing and the FAA for longer-term safety enhancements that would kick in presumably months after the MAX resumes commercial operations. According to U.S. industry and government officials, Mr. Ky is seeking a third source of flight data—beyond two full-time sensors already on the MAX—to tell computers about the angle of the jet’s nose. EASA has said once planes are back in the air, installation of a third sensor or equivalent system “could be undertaken at a later stage.”

    Once the aircraft is cleared, it is expected to take months for a carrier such as Southwest Airlines Co. to work its MAX fleet back into passenger-flight schedules. Southwest has some 70 MAX jets, including aircraft it had in service and new jets still awaiting delivery.

    The timing of the aircraft’s return is critical for Boeing as it considers whether to further cut production at its Renton, Wash., factory, or even suspend operations, while MAX jets pile up in storage. Before the recent concerns expressed by EASA, senior FAA officials were thinking they could be ready to give the green light for MAX flights as soon as early November, according to people familiar with the matter. The friction with their European counterparts is likely to delay that timeline until at least later that month, these people added.

    Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Orders are being cancelled:

    Quote Bye-bye Boeing: Russia’s biggest airline cancels 787 Dreamliner order
    10 Oct, 2019 08:53

    Russian flagship carrier Aeroflot has formally canceled an order for 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliners valued at about $5.5 billion. This adds to the pressure on Boeing due to the grounding of 737 MAX jets after two recent crashes.

    The cancelation was not announced by either side but was buried in Boeing’s monthly order release.

    According to Reuters’ sources, the US plane maker faces the growing possibility that it may have to cut production back by 2022 as the grounding of its popular 737 MAX stretches into its eighth month.

    One of the sources said Boeing has dozens of unsold or potentially vacant 787 positions on its production line in 2022. The actual number of unfilled production slots depends on assessments about the ability of airlines to take delivery as promised, which plane makers keep confidential.

    Statistics showed demand for the narrow-body aircraft that dominate most fleets remains strong. Meanwhile, demand for larger, long-haul aircraft like the 787 and Airbus A330 and A350 has weakened.

    Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said last month the company was closely tracking “macro risk areas.” He added Boeing had reserved slots on its 777 and 787 production lines for Chinese orders that have been held back by the trade war.

    “There is dependency there on Chinese orders ultimately coming through,” Muilenburg said.

    Some suppliers were surprised by his comments as plane makers typically raise output only after selling aircraft rather than opening the taps in hopes of winning orders later.

    Company data shows Boeing officially booked a previously announced order from Air New Zealand for eight 787-10s, which is the largest Dreamliner model.
    From: https://www.rt.com/business/470600-a...mpression=true
    *I have loved the stars too dearly to be fearful of the night*

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    More lost orders for Boeing and in favor of Airbus:

    https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/bo...-airbus-planes

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Satori (here)
    As I understand it, the problem with this plane, that they tried to fix with a computer system that overrides pilots in the cockpit, is that the engines on the plane are too large and touch the ground on the 737 Max. So, they moved the engines forward and up on the wings. This created air dynamic, flight and stability problems that they tried to compensate for with computer and related software and hardware. But, they did not educate and train, or at least not adequately educate and train, pilots, maintenance etc...This plane is unsafe at any altitude.
    It might have been easier and had less of an effect if Boeing just increased the length of the undercarriage to gain that extra clearance and simply allow the undercarriage to compress that extra length under retraction.

    That would have been a simpler fix. But I suppose that what happens when your under pressure to find a solution yesterday then over think about possible solutions and get tunnel vision about which way to approach it.
    In hoc signo vinces / In this sign thou shalt conquer

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Boeing is suspending production of the 737 Max in January

    Boeing will halt production of its 737 Max narrow-body jet in January, escalating the company’s crisis as it prepares to end a year marked by accidents, scandals, and a plummeting public perception. The Wall Street Journal first reported the halts, citing a person briefed on the matter.

    The prospect of assembly being halted was raised over the weekend. Boeing first suggested in July that it could slow or suspend production if the jet remained grounded going into 2020.

    Boeing’s 737 Max has been grounded worldwide since the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second of two fatal crashes involving the jet within five months.

    The plane maker’s Renton, Washington, factory, where the 737 Max is manufactured, employs 12,000 workers. A Boeing spokesperson told Business Insider that no furloughs or layoffs were expected „at this time“ and that employees would continue 737-related work, or be temporarily assigned to nearby teams. It was not clear whether Boeing’s other facilities could absorb employees through a prolonged production halt.

    --- snip ---
    https://www.businessinsider.de/inter...nding-2019-12/

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Give pilots the option in an emergency. Remove control by computer and return control to the pilots may work.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Dear Ron Mauer: Your appearance reminds me of a former father-in-law, who was also a meticulous, honest person who never appeared to lose his temper.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    The article from CNN below details how the 737-Max plane will plague Boeing for many more years to come. There is good short video in the beginning of the CNN article which one of the commentator says that one of the first major blunder that Boeing committed was failure to include documentation of the MCAS into the pilot manual for the plane. Boeing management felt it was not worth mentioning in the flight manual for the plane. This is really outrageous decision by Boeing management among other bad decisions. I hope some people will take class action suit against Boeing for the many egregious decisions by Boeing management. As would be expected, Boeing stock is starting to tank even more recently.

    Luckily for the public, FAA is beginning to step up to the plate by insisting that it will certify each plane individually.

    Source

    Boeing's 737 Max woes will last for several more years

    By Chris Isidore, CNN Business
    Updated 3:42 PM ET, Tue December 17, 2019

    <<<embedded video from CNN>>>

    New York (CNN Business) - Boeing's 737 Max crisis keeps getting worse and worse. And there is no clear end in sight.

    In March, following the second of two fatal crashes that killed a total of 346 people, Boeing promised a fix would be in place "in the coming weeks." The company was wrong on the timing, and now there's no telling when the 737 Max jets will fly again.

    On Monday, the company suspended production of the jets. While the planes may be airborne sooner, analysts estimate that it could be well into 2022, maybe even 2023, before Boeing is able to put its 737 Max problems behind it.

    As recently as last week, Boeing was insisting that it could get approval for the plane to fly again by the end of this year. Then FAA administrator Stephen Dickson said there were too many steps to complete to grant an approval until sometime in 2020. That prompted Boeing to announce Monday that it will temporarily halt production of the 737 Max, starting next month, for an undetermined length of time.

    When will the Max fly again?

    Analysts say it's difficult to come up with an estimate for when the Max might gain approval to fly again, due to the lack of details from Boeing or the FAA. All the agency and company will say is that they are working to first make sure the plane is completely safe .

    "You get little snippets of information. I would say mid-February is a guess, but it could be March," said Cai von Rumohr, aerospace analyst with Cowen. "It's pretty hard to say it will be X or Y date."

    Ronald Epstein, analyst with Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said he's now expecting approval around March 1, but he could see it going as late as May.

    How long to deliver the planes it has built?

    Boeing continued building the planes since the grounding, despite being unable to deliver them to customers. That left the company unable to get most of the money for the sales, because airline customers pay the bulk of what's owed upon delivery.

    The company has about 400 completed planes parked in Washington State and Texas awaiting approval to fly in commercial service. Boeing says it expects it will be at least 2021 before it can deliver the backlog to customers, but analysts think it could stretch into at least mid-2022, depending on when the company starts building the jets again.

    Part of that backup is because airlines can't take immediate delivery of all of the jets Boeing has built for them -- they need time to integrate the planes into their fleets.


    Related Article: Boeing is halting production of the embattled 737 Max starting in January

    "Two or three planes per airline per month would be a pretty aggressive schedule," Epstein said. And the process of delivering the jets will be time consuming, especially since the FAA itself will now certify each plane individually. In the past, Boeing was allowed to sign off on the jets as they rolled off the assembly line.

    "That's a lot of planes to deliver. You've got to do pre-delivery checkouts. You've got the FAA looking over their shoulder," said von Rumohr.

    Will there be layoffs?


    For now at least, Boeing will keep all of its employees on the payroll. Von Rumohr said that's partly an indication of the strength of the current job market, with national unemployment at a 50-year low, and lower still in the Seattle area at 3.3%. Boeing doesn't want to risk losing the employees it will need to restart production.

    What happens with Boeing's suppliers, though, is less clear. Several said Tuesday that they are still waiting for guidance from the company. Analysts believe that the company will have to provide some financial support to its suppliers to ensure they're ready when production on the 737 Max starts up again.

    "We expect Boeing to support suppliers...in order to preserve labor and production capabilities," said JPMorgan analyst Seth Seifman in a note late Monday.

    How much will it cost Boeing?

    Even though Boeing will save money by shutting production, it will still incur significant costs while its assembly lines are idle.

    "We estimate that Boeing is burning nearly $2 billion per month on the Max but this will not drop to zero during the halt," said Seifman in his note. "For now, we assume about 50% of supply chain costs hang around, resulting in monthly cash burn that is still solidly greater than $1 billion."

    Boeing has already set aside $5 billion to compensate airlines for the groundings. But that is likely only a fraction of what the final cost will be. The company said it will give a financial update when it reports fourth quarter results. Epstein estimates the 737 Max grounding will eventually cost the company about $14 billion.

    The good news for Boeing is that it can likely afford this kind of financial hit. It has a healthy balance sheet and access to capital markets needed to raise funds, and a better credit rating than its airline customers.

    The hit to the US economy

    Even so, the shutdown is a major event that eventually could affect not just Boeing and the airlines but also spread to nation's economy. If it lasts through March, it could trim about a 0.5 percentage points off the US gross domestic product in the quarter, according to estimates from several economists. The economic hit could be even greater if it starts to result in layoffs.

    "Boeing's decision to halt production of the 737 Max aircraft could deliver a big hit to the manufacturing sector just as prospects were beginning to brighten," wrote Michael Pearce, senior US economist at Capital Economics.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Quote Posted by Ron Mauer Sr (here)
    Give pilots the option in an emergency. Remove control by computer and return control to the pilots may work.
    They did just that ... at least according to this article below:

    Quote Boeing’s fix tames the ‘tiger’ in the 737 MAX flight controls, say experts and critics

    Nov. 17, 2019 at 6:00 am Updated Nov. 21, 2019 at 5:02 pm

    After months of intense scrutiny, even some of the harshest critics of the 737 MAX’s flight-control system believe Boeing’s software fix will prevent a recurrence of the scenarios that killed 346 people in the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

    Boeing has redesigned the MAX’s new automated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that relentlessly pushed down the noses of the two aircraft on both crash flights. Though serious questions linger about the overall safety culture at Boeing that waved through MCAS’s original development and certification, U.S. airline pilots are almost ready to fly the updated jet.

    “The hazard is designed out of it,” Capt. John DeLeeuw, chairman of the safety committee of the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the union for American Airlines pilots, declared to colleagues a week after trying the flight-control fix in a Boeing simulator in Miami in late September.

    Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer and former fighter pilot in the Swedish Air Force, now a France-based aviation analyst with Leeham.net, has said Boeing’s original MCAS design was “criminally badly done … unforgivable,” and compared the system’s aggressiveness to a tiger. He too believes the redesign now makes the airplane as safe as the previous 737 model.

    “There’s no part of any airplane out there that’s been as thoroughly vetted,” said Fehrm. “MCAS is no longer a tiger, but a house cat.”

    The final pieces of that vetting are now imminent.

    Boeing expects the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to formally unground the jet next month and to pin down all the pilot training requirements in January.

    That’s pending a formal certification flight and a final evaluation of the software fix for the jet’s flight controls. And the FAA insisted Friday that it will take its time and won’t be swayed by pressure from Boeing.

    --- snip ---

    Boeing’s fix for MCAS entails three changes to the system design:
    • It will take input from the jet’s two angle of attack sensors instead of just one.

      If they disagree by more than a nominal amount, the system assumes a false signal and will not activate.

      If both angle of attack sensors somehow get stuck at the same wrong high value — perhaps if they got frozen in the wrong position — again MCAS won’t activate because the upgrade is designed to do so only when the angle moves suddenly from below the threshold to a new high value.
    • If both sensors together register a sudden movement to a high angle of attack, the system will activate once only — not repeatedly, as in the accident flights.
    • The capability of the system to move the horizontal stabilizer so as to pitch the jet nose-down will be limited. The pilot will always be able to counter it by pulling back on the control column.
    In addition, Boeing has revised the overall architecture of the MAX’s flight-control computer system, so that on every flight the MAX takes separate inputs from the jet’s two flight-control computers, rather than just one as previously.

    These two computers, each processing air data readings from the various sensors on both sides of the airplane, will cross-check and compare values. Again, if they disagree, automated systems including MCAS will be shut down.

    This change should catch any computer error as opposed to a sensor fault.

    A person briefed on the details said such a shutdown would come in less than one-third of a second, so even if the pilots are distracted and fail to notice the airplane moving as it shouldn’t, the automation won’t be allowed to continue.

    This addresses a problem identified in both accident investigations: that pilots took much longer to recognize and react to an MCAS fault than Boeing had assumed. By stopping any erroneous uncommanded movements automatically, the redesign takes the response out of the pilots’ hands altogether.

    “We’re not letting the system run while the pilots are inattentive,” said the person, who required anonymity because parties to the ongoing accident investigations are not allowed to speak publicly.

    Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight-controls engineer and avionics expert who has been very critical of the original MCAS design, said Boeing has addressed all his concerns.

    --- snip ---
    https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ight-controls/

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    There is a new design flaw in the 737 Max that recently came to light:

    Boeing has uncovered another potential design flaw with the 737 Max

    By Clare Duffy, CNN Business
    Updated 8:32 PM ET, Sun January 5, 2020

    New York (CNN Business) Hundreds of 737 Max jets are sitting, grounded, as Boeing awaits approval from aviation regulators for the troubled plane to return to flight. But now, the company has discovered yet another potential hurdle.

    The plane was grounded worldwide in March after two crashes that killed 346 people. The company determined a software fix was likely to correct the issue with the automatic safety feature that caused the crashes.

    However, as part of a December audit of the plane's safety ordered by the US Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing (BA) found "previously unreported concerns" with wiring in the 737 Max, according to a report earlier Sunday from the New York Times. The company informed the FAA last month that it is looking into whether two sections of wiring that control the tail of the plane are too close together and could cause a short circuit — and potentially a crash, if pilots did not react appropriately -— the Times reported, citing a senior Boeing engineer and three people familiar with the matter.

    A Boeing spokesperson confirmed the report to CNN Business on Sunday, saying the issue was identified as part of a "rigorous process" to ensure the plane's safety.


    Related Article: Boeing hit with another lawsuit over troubled 737 Max

    "Our highest priority is ensuring the 737 Max meets all safety and regulatory requirements before it returns to service," the spokesperson said. "We are working closely with the FAA and other regulators on a robust and thorough certification process to ensure a safe and compliant design."

    The spokesperson said it "would be premature to speculate" whether the discovery will lead to new design changes for the plane, or further extend the timeline for its recertification.

    It will be a challenge for Boeing's new chief executive, David Calhoun, who officially takes over the job on January 13 after former CEO Dennis Muilenburg was ousted on December 23.

    "A change in leadership was necessary to restore confidence in the company moving forward as it works to repair relationships with regulators, customers, and all other stakeholders," the company in December.

    Earlier in December, the company announced it would take the dramatic step of suspending production of the 737 Max in light of the continued setbacks to recertification.

    Orders for the 737 Max dried up following the grounding, and it wasn't until November that Boeing recorded its first new orders since the grounding. In the meantime, the company had continued to produce the planes at a rate of 42 jets a month, in hopes of a quick recertification by airline regulators around the globe.

    But as the process was pushed into 2020, Boeing said the plane's uncertain future had forced it to pause production and prioritize the delivery of the approximately 400 airplanes it has in storage.

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    Default Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Leaked Emails PROVE Boeing KNEW The 737 MAX Was Dangerous, They Admit To Covering it Up

    It’s Not Just Software: New Safety Risks Under Scrutiny on Boeing’s 737 Max

    The company and regulators are looking into everything from the wiring on the plane to its engines.


    A 737 Max at Boeing’s assembly plant in Renton, Wash., last month. Boeing said it would temporarily stop making the 737.Credit...Elaine Thompson/Associated Press

    Even as Boeing inches closer to getting the 737 Max back in the air, new problems with the plane are emerging that go beyond the software that played a role in two deadly crashes.As part of the work to return the Max to service, the company and regulators have scrutinized every aspect of the jet, uncovering new potential design flaws.

    At the request of the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing conducted an internal audit in December to determine whether it had accurately assessed the dangers of key systems given new assumptions about how long it might take pilots to respond to emergencies, according to a senior engineer at Boeing and three people familiar with the matter.

    Among the most pressing issues discovered were previously unreported concerns with the wiring that helps control the tail of the Max.

    The company is looking at whether two bundles of critical wiring are too close together and could cause a short circuit. A short in that area could lead to a crash if pilots did not respond correctly, the people said. Boeing is still trying to determine whether that scenario could actually occur on a flight and, if so, whether it would need to separate the wire bundles in the roughly 800 Max jets that have already been built. The company says that the fix, if needed, is relatively simple.

    The company informed the F.A.A. about the potential vulnerability last month, and Boeing’s new chief executive discussed possible changes to the wiring on an internal conference call last week, according to one of the people and the Boeing engineer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

    The company may eventually need to look into whether the same problem exists on the 737 NG, the predecessor to the Max. There are currently about 6,800 of those planes in service.

    The senior Boeing engineer said that finding such problems and fixing them was not unusual and not particular to the Max or to Boeing.

    The emergence of new troubles with the Max threatens to extend a crisis that is consuming one of America’s most influential companies and disrupting the global aviation business. The Max has been grounded since March, after two crashes killed 346 people. The crashes were caused in part by new software on the Max, MCAS, which triggered erroneously and sent the planes into nose dives. Boeing has developed a fix for the software, but it has not yet been approved, and the process of returning the plane to service has taken much longer than Boeing expected.

    The Max is Boeing’s most important plane, with about 5,000 ordered by airlines around the world. But as the grounding has dragged on, Boeing said it would temporarily shut down its 737 factory, jolting thousands of suppliers and stoking the concern of President Trump.

    Boeing abruptly fired its chief executive late last month after he alienated the F.A.A. and airline customers. His successor is now contending with the fallout, as Boeing’s share price has fallen by 21 percent and the company faces tens of billions of dollars in charges related to the grounding.

    Regulators have suggested that the Max could be approved to fly again by the spring, a timetable that could still hold. The company says that even if it needs to fix the wiring issue, it would only take one to two hours per plane to separate the wiring bundles on the Max using a clamp.

    “We are working closely with the F.A.A. and other regulators on a robust and thorough certification process to ensure a safe and compliant design,” Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman, said in a statement. “We identified these issues as part of that rigorous process, and we are working with the F.A.A. to perform the appropriate analysis. It would be premature to speculate as to whether this analysis will lead to any design changes.”

    Investigations by international regulators into the cause of the two Max crashes determined that pilots of those flights did not respond as quickly or effectively as Boeing and the F.A.A., using accepted industry standards, presumed they would when designing and evaluating the MCAS software.

    So in developing a software update for the Max, Boeing and the F.A.A. recognized that the previous industry assumptions should be changed, and that they needed to consider what would happen if it took crews much longer to act in the face of emergencies.

    Using that new set of assumptions about pilot reactions, Boeing discovered that if two wire bundles placed close together toward the rear of the plane caused an electrical short, it could lead to a catastrophic accident. The wiring connects to the motor that controls the stabilizer, the horizontal fin on a plane’s tail, sending signals from the flight control computer that can push the nose down or lift it up.

    If pilots did not recognize the problem and quickly take appropriate action, the plane could go into a nose dive, the senior Boeing engineer said. Under those circumstances, a short could bring a plane down in the same way that the MCAS software did on both doomed flights, forcing the stabilizer’s motor to run uncontrollably.

    Boeing is still working to determine how likely it is that the wires could actually short circuit. The company does not want to make changes to the plane’s wiring if it doesn't have to, fearing that additional damage could be done during a repair.

    The engines on the Max have also become a focus of scrutiny for regulators. CFM International, the joint venture between General Electric and Safran that manufactures the engines, has told the F.A.A. it discovered a possible weakness in one of the engines’ rotors, which could cause the part to shatter. The likelihood of that failure is remote and regulators aren’t requiring an immediate fix, though they are looking to require that airlines inspect as many Max engines as possible before the plane returns to service, an F.A.A. official said.

    A 737 MAX production line inside the Boeing factory in Renton last month.Credit...Stephen Brashear/Getty Images

    Boeing also recently told the F.A.A. that it had discovered a manufacturing problem that left the plane’s engines vulnerable to a lightning strike.

    While assembling the Max, workers at Boeing’s Renton, Wash., factory had ground down the outer shell of a panel that sits atop the engine housing in an effort to ensure a better fit into the plane. In doing so, they inadvertently removed the coating that insulates the panel from a lightning strike, taking away a crucial protection for the fuel tank and fuel lines. The F.A.A. is developing a directive that will require the company to restore lightning protection to the engine panel and Boeing is already in the process of resolving the issue.

    “The F.A.A. and Boeing are analyzing certain findings from a recent review of the proposed modifications to the Boeing 737 MAX,” an F.A.A. spokesman, Lynn Lunsford, said in a statement. “As part of its continuing oversight, the agency will ensure that all safety-related issues identified during this process are addressed before the aircraft is approved for return to passenger service.”

    The new issues pose additional challenges for Boeing’s leadership. Late last month, the company’s board fired the chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg. He is being replaced on an interim basis by Greg Smith, the former chief financial officer. Next week, David Calhoun, until recently the nonexecutive chairman of Boeing’s board, will take over as chief executive.

    On an internal conference call last Thursday, the question of changing the wiring on the Max came up, according to the senior Boeing engineer and another person familiar with the matter. At one point, a Boeing employee asked about whether the fix would need to be made to every plane in the fleet if the issue was found to be low risk. Mr. Smith replied that if changes were needed, they would have to be comprehensive.
    Mr. Smith’s sober response served as an immediate contrast to Mr. Muilenburg, who repeatedly made overly optimistic projections about what was needed to get the Max back into service.

    Boeing was already confronting a number of problems with the 737 Max and its predecessor.

    In recent simulator tests with crews from American, Southwest and United Airlines as well as Aeromexico, many pilots did not use the prescribed emergency procedures to handle problems with the flights, raising the possibility that regulators could mandate flight simulator training or change the procedures before clearing the plane to fly. The F.A.A. is evaluating Boeing’s analysis of the testing.

    Still, there are signs that Boeing is making progress toward getting the Max flying again. Regulators from Europe plan to fly to Seattle this week to test the new software in a flight simulator, a sign that international authorities believe the company is far enough along that its fix is ready for serious evaluation, according to two people familiar with the matter.

    Government officials believe that the plane may be cleared for a certification test flight as soon as this month, where the company must demonstrate the plane meets all the safety requirements. The flight — the regulator’s final exam for the Max — is a significant milestone and one of the last hurdles the company needs to clear for regulators to lift the grounding.

    American Airlines and Southwest Airlines are currently planning to use the Max for commercial flights in April, while United Airlines has scheduled Max flights for June.

    “Our highest priority is ensuring the 737 Max meets all safety and regulatory requirements before it returns to service,” said Mr. Johndroe, the Boeing spokesman.

    Source


    Fired Boeing CEO won't receive severance, but he cashed out with $60+ million in benefits
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    Exclamation Re: Boeing Mega Troubles with its 737 MAX 8 Overriding Nose Dive Crashes

    Boeing 737 MAX was 'designed by clowns'


    Meanwhile:
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    Source Screen-snapshot!


    Worldwide grounding:

    In March 2019, aviation authorities around the world grounded the Boeing 737 MAX passenger airliner after two new airplanes crashed within five months, killing all 346 people aboard. After the first accident, Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018, investigators suspected that the MAX's "new" Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was omitted from flight manuals and crew training, automatically and repeatedly forced the aircraft to nosedive. In November 2018, Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sent airlines urgent messages to emphasize a flight recovery procedure, and Boeing started to redesign MCAS. In December 2018, studies by the FAA and Boeing concluded that MCAS posed an unacceptable safety risk. On March 10, 2019 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed, despite the crew's attempt to use the recovery procedure. The airline grounded its MAX fleet that day.

    On March 11, the Civil Aviation Administration of China was the first regulator to ground the MAX. The FAA publicly reaffirmed the airworthiness of the aircraft on March 11, but grounded it on March 13 after receiving new evidence of accident similarities. By March 18, all regulators worldwide banned the airliner. The groundings affected 387 airplanes making 8,600 weekly flights for 59 airlines.

    After the second accident, the U.S. Congress, federal agencies and ad hoc panels began investigating and monitoring FAA certification of the aircraft, especially the delegation of self-approval authority to Boeing. In March, The Seattle Times reported that changes by Boeing prior to certification made MCAS gain power and lose safeguards, and that Boeing produced a flawed safety analysis and inadequately communicated the changes to the FAA, which poorly understood them. In April, Boeing admitted that MCAS played a role in both accidents. In October 2019, the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee Lion Air accident report concluded that airplane design flaws, inadequate certification and safety regulation, maintenance errors, and flight crew actions contributed to the crash. In November 2019, the FAA revoked Boeing's authority to issue airworthiness certificates for individual MAX airplanes. In January 2020, Boeing reverted its position and recommended simulator training for pilots.

    Affected airlines canceled thousands of flights, and Boeing suspended deliveries and reduced production of the MAX. The grounding became the longest ever of a U.S. airliner, as other system problems emerged and regulators required more corrective work. As of November 2019, Boeing had lost over $10 billion in revenue and compensation expenses to airlines and bereaved families, and faced lawsuits from pilots and victims' families. In December 2019 Boeing forced its CEO to resign over mismanagement of the crisis. With more than 400 of the aircraft awaiting delivery, Boeing planned to temporarily halt MAX production in January 2020 until regulators clear the airliner to fly again.

    Source
    Last edited by ExomatrixTV; 11th January 2020 at 00:34.
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