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Inside story: Israel declares war on Iran’s warrior-diplomats
Israel’s suspected bombing of what Iran describes as its diplomatic premises in Damascus, killing Mohammad Reza Zahedi—the top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in the Levant—is a major escalation with reverberations on multiple dimensions. The overarching aim appears to be to provoke a response from Hezbollah and Iran as they pursue direct talks with Gulf Arab states and indirect engagement with the US.
Changing the rules of the game
In legal and operational terms, the bombing raises major questions about the state of international norms protecting diplomatic personnel and premises. Iran has described the targeted building, located next to its embassy in the Syrian capital, as a consulate that also housed the ambassador’s residence. Israeli sources have indicated that the site was bombed as members of the IRGC’s expeditionary Quds Force were meeting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). If the building is recognized as a diplomatic site, such a gathering would be protected under international conventions.
Equally importantly, Israel has in past months signaled that all IRGC targets are fair game—regardless of any dual diplomatic credentials.
Killed alongside his deputy and five other officers, Zahedi is said to have been accredited as a staff member of the Iranian embassy in Damascus. So was Seyed Radhi Mousavi, the previous Quds Force second-in-command in Lebanon and Syria who was assassinated in a suspected Israeli operation late last year, holding the diplomatic rank of second counselor.
But as Israel signals a change to the rules of the game, Iran insists on past assumptions. Speaking on condition of anonymity, informed Arab and Iranian sources told Amwaj.media that in the days prior to his assassination, indications of an imminent threat led Mousavi to be instructed to remain at the “Damascus consulate.” This was based on the assumption that the building would be immune to attack. Ultimately, Mousavi was killed less than an hour after leaving the building for the southern suburb of Sayyidah Zainab.
Assault on Hezbollah-IRGC nexus
One distinguishing aspect of Iran’s mission in Syria is the number of high-profile casualties. In Feb. 2013, IRGC commander Hassan Shateri was slain on the road between Damascus and Beirut. Tehran quickly blamed Israel. Two years later, in early 2015, senior military commander Mohammad Ali Allahdadi lost his life in a reported Israeli airstrike alongside several other officers from Iran and members of Lebanese Hezbollah.
But while killings of high-ranking officers in Syria are nothing new, the pace of suspected Israeli assassinations has surged since the eruption of the Gaza war in Oct. 2023.
The attack on Mousavi, the IRGC second-in-command in the Levant, was on par with the US killing of former IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Israel’s targeting of late Hezbollah military chief Imad Mughniyeh, experts say. Mousavi had been in charge of facilitating the entry of Iran-led forces and arms shipments to Syria and Hezbollah. As Tehran was reeling from the shock incident, another suspected Israeli airstrike only weeks later killed the Quds Force’s intelligence deputy in Syria.
Enter the assassination of Zahedi, the most senior Quds Force officer in Damascus. Having first arrived in Lebanon in the mid-2000s, informed sources told Amwaj.media, he quickly established a strong network within Hezbollah. Zahedi rose to become the only non-Lebanese member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council. According to one Arab source, he also served as the IRGC’s delegate on the movement’s Jihadi Council, holding effective “veto power.”
While Zahedi was replaced by senior IRGC officer Mohammad Hejazi in 2014, he returned when Hejazi got ill in late 2020. The following year, Zahedi rose in rank when the then-head of IRGC operations in Syria—Mustafa Javad Ghaffari—was recalled under contentious circumstances. Overnight, he became the top Quds Force officer in all of the Levant.
So the killing of a figure such as Zahedi is not merely a direct assault on Iran. It is also an attack on a key element of the connective tissue between Hezbollah and the IRGC, in line with the pattern of assassinations targeting Quds Force command and control in the area.
The bigger picture
Israel’s latest suspected attack is also an apparent effort to press Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to take action. Iran’s supreme leader has so far refused to retaliate for the string of high-profile killings in Syria. If the death of Zahedi compels a rash Iranian response—particularly if direct and overt—it could open the path to a genuine regionalization of the Gaza war. Tehran has avoided such an approach as it would shift focus away from the Palestinians to Iran and its regional alliance network known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’.
While a wider conflagration appears distant, the region is already halfway there. For the past eight weeks or so, there has been a cease-fire between the Axis and the US in Iraq and Syria, brokered in the aftermath of the killing of American troops in Jordan in late January. But the truce is shaky, and was forged after the Joe Biden administration showed that it is ready to kill senior Iraqi commanders in the heart of Baghdad. In Yemen, British and US forces have for months been bombing positions of the Ansarullah movement, better known as the Houthis.
These dynamics do not mean that Iran and the United States have any interest in a region-wide confrontation. To the contrary, the two sides have in past months set aside differences over Iran’s bloody crackdown on protests and arms sales to Russia and secretly spoken. Senior informed diplomatic and political sources have indicated to Amwaj.media that those talks are ongoing and conducted through multiple channels, beyond meetings in Oman. The dialogue is not likely to turn into something transformational, particularly in an election year in the US. However, the appetite for de-escalation has proven to be genuine.
But without an effort by the Biden administration to rein in the actions of its Israeli ally, Khamenei is under rising pressure to respond to the provocations. The supreme leader has exercised “strategic patience” in the face of repeated goading. As Iran is in the grip of leadership transition—and as some conservatives in Tehran are calling for more assertive foreign policy—the stakes could not be higher.
Apart from targeting the Iran-US de-escalation effort, an Israeli declaration of war on the IRGC in the region may also be geared to sabotage the reportedly Syrian-brokered rapprochement between Hezbollah and Gulf Arab states.
As Amwaj.media has previously reported, a senior Hezbollah official recently paid a visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The rare public trip was focused on the release of Lebanese detainees. However, wider political issues are said to have been on the agenda—with a claimed Syrian mediation role in dealings between Hezbollah and the UAE.
Ultimately, informed Arab sources have indicated to Amwaj.media, the engagement over the Lebanese detainees could be an initial step towards Gulf Arab normalization with Hezbollah. In this context, “several meetings” are reported to have already been held between senior Hezbollah and UAE officials in Damascus.
Looking ahead
Iran has in past years sought to establish a strategic logic of deterring Israeli airstrikes in Syria by retaliating against US forces in the country via local allies. Beyond failing to prevent aerial assaults, this formula has been upturned by the current truce in Iraq and Syria between the Axis and the US.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a political insider in Tehran with knowledge of decision making told Amwaj.media, “There are a variety of options for a response. I find it unlikely that a missile will be fired at a site inside Israel. However, Israel’s diplomatic centers could be attacked where there are capabilities for such an operation, albeit without Iran claiming responsibility—taking into account the political considerations for relations with such a country.” The source described a second option as more diffuse action, with “the main point being for Iran and Israel to both understand how they respond.” He elaborated, “So there may be a response which may not be clear to you and I, but certainly clear to both sides.”
The third option, the source in Tehran emphasized, could be for Iran to avoid a response on the spot. The Iranians may wait, he explained, especially as Israel’s diplomatic missions are on high alert while Israeli forces along the border with Lebanon are in a state of readiness. “It could be that they do not want to respond imminently, to exhaust the Israelis by keeping them on their toes and then strike when their guard is lowered.” He concluded, “In my view, no specific response has been decided on, and if there is such a decision, it is not likely that they will implement it in the coming two days or so. Rather, they will seek to first exhaust Israel by keeping it on alert.”
Referring to the Iranian foreign minister’s assertion that “an important message” has been sent to the United States, a second political insider told Amwaj.media that Tehran expects a more active role from Washington in the face of Israeli escalation. “Since the US has been continuously asking Iran about de-escalation, Iran is giving the ultimatum that this is the end of its efforts if the US does not stop Israel.” The Iranian source emphasized that Tehran “will not respond directly” to the killing of Zahedi, with any retaliatory action likely to be “indirect.” Mindful of the strategic logic that the Islamic Republic has sought to impose in Syria, the latter could put pressure on the truce between the Axis and the US.
There are other complexities to consider as well. The absence of an Iranian response, some regional observers privately charge, could send both the Axis and Israel the message that Tel Aviv could, for instance, target Hezbollah’s leadership without fear of any consequences. Such an environment would be further destabilizing for the region as it could cause fractures and tensions within the Iran-led alliance network.
Last but certainly not least, the islamic Republic may feel compelled to shift away from its preference to separate between attacks in the region and operations against its nuclear program. If Iran concludes that the potential costs of extraterritorial action outweigh the benefits, it could adopt nuclear escalation as a pressure tactic. Such a response would not only undermine de-escalation with the US, but set a dangerous precedent as the wall between the nuclear and regional files would finally come down.
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