The Battle of Kursk. The largest tank battle in human history during World War II [Archive]

Russian Bear

17th September 2025, 18:17

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Soviet Storm. WW2 in the East - The Battle Of Kursk. Episode 9. StarMedia. English Dubbing:
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Soviet Storm. WW2 in the East - The Battle Of Kursk. Episode 9. StarMedia. English Dubbing:
Episode 1-18 with English voiceover, this story is removed to YouTube and banned from showing in many countries. Because now Russia is being erased from all history books and history books are being rewritten, distorting history: https://watchdocumentaries.com/sovie...2-in-the-east/

40) 💣(History, World War II USSR) Soviet Storm. World War 2 in the East:
https://projectavalon.net/forum4/showthread.php?129506-Soviet-Storm.-World-War-2-in-the-East&p=1663735&viewfull=1#post1663735

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"July 1943, the decisive battle near Kursk..."
"The Great Patriotic War. Year 1943"

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More than 80 years ago, one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War began. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and nights and became the largest confrontation in history involving tank units.

✅ The turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War, laid by the victory in Stalingrad, was finally formed after the Battle of Kursk. As a result, the Hitlerite army went on the defensive and counterattacked, and Hitler's main ally in Europe, Italy, withdrew from the war after the Battle of Kursk.

✅ If earlier the Soviet troops fought under the motto: "Not one step back!", then after the Battle of Kursk the motto became: "Forward, to the West!"

✅The Battle of Stalingrad is the most incredible battle in human history.
https://projectavalon.net/forum4/showthread.php?129834-Russian-articles-by-Russian-Bear&p=1673157&viewfull=1#post1673157

Without a second front
The absence of a second front in Europe, which the then allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition – the USA and Britain – had previously promised to open against Nazi Germany, allowed the command of the German Wehrmacht to transfer part of its forces from the west to the east, concentrating 232 divisions there by July 1943.
A total mobilization of human and material resources was carried out in Germany. Most of the forces and resources were included in the German army groups "South" and "Center", which were supposed to solve the main tasks.
The German command decided to concentrate its efforts on one area – in the area of the Kursk salient. On April 15, 1943, the leader of the German tribes (Reich Chancellor, Fuhrer) A. Hitler approved a directive defining the tasks in the offensive operation, which was called "Citadel". It was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with two attacks in converging directions - from the north, from the area south of Orel, from the south - from the Belgorod area.

"The Battle of Kursk, in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, the intensity, the results and the military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive (5-12 July); the Oryol (12 July - 18 August) and the Belgorod-Kharkov (3-23 August) offensive operations. The German side called the offensive part of the battle "Operation Citadel". At all stages of the battle (defensive and offensive), up to 4 million people participated on both sides (for comparison: in the Battle of Stalingrad - up to 2 million people)." During the Battle of Kursk [near Prokhorovka] "the largest head-on tank battle of the Second World War took place. According to various sources, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated in the battle on both sides at the same time." The review "July 1943, the decisive battle near Kursk..." is based on materials from four books published in different years, which complement each other and provide interesting and new facts about this decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War, which is also called the turning point in the war. Materials from the books by Mavrodin V., Volynkin N., Yezhov V. "Whoever enters us with a sword will perish by the sword" (1972); Nechaev S. "The Great Patriotic War. Complete History" (2019); "The Battle of Kursk. A Radical Turning Point in the War" (2020); Toroptsev A. "Strategy of the Second World War. Eastern Front (2018) will remind readers of one of the bloodiest battles in world history – the Battle of Kursk, and will tell about the courage and heroism of the Soviet people, who defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland in a brutal battle with fascism.

THE BATTLE OF KURSK

Mavrodin V., Volynkin N., Yezhov V. He who enters us with a sword will perish by the sword (1972).

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By the summer of 1943, the Soviet Armed Forces had grown considerably stronger, their combat skills had improved, and the morale of the soldiers had risen. The active army units had over 6.4 million men, almost 99 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 field rocket artillery units, 9,580 tanks and self-propelled guns, and almost 8,300 combat aircraft. In April 1943, the Reserve Front (later renamed the Steppe Front) was created, consisting of seven combined arms and four tank armies, five separate tank and mechanized corps, tasked with preparing troops primarily for an offensive. The Nazis were also preparing for new battles. Embittered by the catastrophe on the banks of the Volga, they were gathering forces for revenge. The fascists placed special hopes on the new Tiger

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and Panther tanks,

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as well as on the Ferdinand heavy self-propelled guns.

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The fascist command chose the Kursk region as the site of their offensive. Here, between Orel and Kharkov, Soviet troops formed a salient that went down in the history of the war as the Kursk Bulge. The Nazis considered this bridgehead to be the initial springboard for a new attack on Moscow and the Donbass. To carry out the offensive operation, codenamed Citadel, the Nazi command concentrated 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions. Soviet military intelligence managed to promptly uncover the preparations of the Hitlerite army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge. In particular, information about this was also received from N.I. Kuznetsov, a famous intelligence officer of the special detachment of Colonel D.N. Medvedev. The Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme Command gave the order to create a deeply echeloned defense and simultaneously concentrate large reserves so that, having repelled the enemy's attacks, they themselves could then go on the offensive. "It is difficult to list the entire range of major events," says Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, "that were carried out by the State Defense Committee, Headquarters, and the General Staff in the interests of preparing for the decisive battle on the Kursk Bulge. ... such measures included the creation of a multi-lane defense in the Kursk direction to a total depth of 250-300 km, and the deployment of a powerful strategic reserve of the Headquarters - the Steppe Front - to the area east of Kursk, and the implementation of the largest concentration of material resources and troops in the Kursk area during the entire war, and the organization of special air operations to disrupt enemy communications and gain air superiority, and the intensification of partisan activities with the aim of organizing mass sabotage in the enemy rear and obtaining the most important intelligence data, and the implementation of a whole range of measures to provide political support for the upcoming actions of the Soviet Army."

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The Nazis failed to take our troops by surprise. On July 2, the Headquarters warned the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, Generals K.K. Rokossovsky and N.F. Vatutin, in a special telegram that the enemy's offensive could be expected between July 3 and 6. The warning from Headquarters was confirmed by German prisoners captured by our soldiers on the night of July 4. The prisoners testified that the offensive was scheduled for three o'clock in the morning the following day. The Soviet command decided to conduct a counter-artillery preparation. And so, at dawn on July 5, a powerful artillery strike fell on the fascist troops preparing for the offensive. The enemy was stunned. The Nazis were forced to postpone the start of their attack for one and a half to two hours. The great battle on the Kursk Bulge unfolded, which was the Nazis' last hope for a decisive success in the East. The main blows of the fascists fell on the strongest sections of our defense. And from the first hour, events began to unfold in a way completely different from what the German command had expected, counting on a triumphal march. Our soldiers did not leave a single inch of land without an order. Guard Sergeant Major B. Makhotin's squad fought bravely against an entire battalion of enemy infantry, exterminating over three hundred fascists. Senior Sergeant A.G. Serebryakov, the party organizer of a company of the 6th Guards Division, replaced the deceased commander at a critical moment in the battle and took command of the platoon. Serebryakov was wounded twice, but led the platoon in a counterattack and accomplished the task. The mortar crew commander, Sergeant Manzus Vanukhov, was wounded when the Nazis broke into the firing positions. Vanukhov threw a grenade at them, but it did not explode. The Nazis jumped into the trench. Vanukhov managed to grab a mine from the box, tore off the cap and hit the mine on the mortar plate. The explosion killed everyone - both the hero Manzus Vanukhov and the enemy. For eight hours, Lieutenant Mikhail Zamula's tank platoon held the line in a stubborn battle. The enemy lost four Tigers, five medium tanks, and an armored personnel carrier.
"The Tigers are burning," the English newspapers wrote in those days. And they were burning from the fire of Soviet tanks and artillery.

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Along with the infantry, artillerymen, and tank crews, Soviet pilots fought with great skill and courage. The famous ace, then a sergeant, now three times Hero of the Soviet Union, I.N. Kozhedub opened his combat account at the Kursk Bulge. Fighter pilot A.K. Gorovets performed an outstanding feat. In the air battle, he shot down nine fascist aircraft one after another.

The enemy offensive lasted less than a week. On July 12, it ended in complete failure. As a result of the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy, having suffered enormous losses and having advanced only 10-12 kilometers in the northern section of the Kursk Bulge and up to
35 kilometers in the southern section, was forced to stop the offensive on July 13. The defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be stronger. The main result of the defensive battle was the crushing defeat inflicted on the enemy's tank forces. This happened as a result of

the victory of the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army of General A.S.
Zhadov in the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943.

The tank battle near Prokhorovka, in which up to 1,200 tanks from both sides took part simultaneously, is unprecedented in the history of the war. Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P.A. Rotmistrov recalls: “The battle lasted until late in the evening. The tanks, locked into one giant ball, could no longer separate. The armor-piercing shells of the Soviet tanks pierced the armor of the enemy tanks. At the same time, the ammunition inside the tanks exploded, and this often led to the turrets being blown off. More than a hundred tanks and self-propelled guns were burning on the battlefield. There was a terrible noise, armor-piercing shells were flying in the air in masses, many of them, hitting the armor, flew to the side with a squeal.” The tank guards did not waver, held out in this famous battle, and then began to push back the enemy. The Nazis lost about 400 tanks destroyed or knocked out.
Having thwarted the advance of the Nazi troops, the Soviet Army began an offensive operation, first in the Orel direction (Operation Kutuzov), and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (Operation Rumyantsev). On August 5, our troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. In honor of the victory, an artillery salute of 124 guns was fired in Moscow for the first time.
The Battle of Kursk ended on August 23 with the liberation of Kharkov. Here, in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the backbone of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht was broken.
The radical turn in the course of the war, which began in the great battle of Moscow and received its greatest development in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, was finally completed. The enemy suffered such a severe defeat that Nazi Germany could no longer recover and quickly make up for its enormous losses. Soviet soldiers routed 30 enemy divisions, including 7 tank divisions, and destroyed more than 3,500 aircraft and 3,000 guns.
It is interesting to note in this regard that even the well-known falsifier of the history of the Great Patriotic War, the English military historian J. Fuller, admits: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the defeat at Kursk was as much of a disaster for the Germans as the defeat at Stalingrad."

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The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk surpassed the counteroffensive at Moscow and on the Volga in terms of the number of forces and resources involved. 22 combined arms, 5 tank, and 6 air armies took part in the counteroffensive at Kursk. The Battle of Kursk lasted almost two months, ending with a convincing victory for the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. After it, a powerful strategic offensive of the Soviet Army began.

Nechaev S. The Great Patriotic War. Complete History (2019).

THE BATTLE OF KURSK

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In 1943, the Kursk operation was also successfully carried out, ending the period of strategic defensive operations in this war.

FOR REFERENCE
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is also known as the Battle of Kursk. It is a combination of defensive (July 5–23) and offensive (July 12–August 23) operations of the Red Army with the aim of disrupting a major fascist offensive and defeating their strategic group. In historiography, it is considered the largest tank battle in history.

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In the spring of 1943, Hitler decided that the Wehrmacht should go on the attack to prevent the expected Soviet offensive and maintain the initiative in the war. Kursk was chosen by Hitler as the site of the offensive, the start of which was scheduled for May 1. The plan was for the 9th Army of Army Group Center under the command of General Walter Model to attack Kursk from the north, while Army Group Werner Kempf, belonging to Army Group South under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, would attack Kursk from the south. With the capture of Kursk, the Germans planned to capture most of the forces of the Central Front (General Rokossovsky) and the Voronezh Front (General Vatutin).
Why did Hitler decide to conduct a general offensive in the Kursk area?
To this question, Marshal G.K. Zhukov responded in his memoirs as follows: “The fact is that the operational location of the Soviet troops on the Kursk salient, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the German command. Here, two large fronts could be surrounded at once, as a result of which a huge gap would be formed, allowing the enemy to carry out large operations in the southern and north-eastern directions.” Nevertheless, the date of the attack was postponed several times, and it was finally set for July 5 (Hitler was expecting the delivery of new armored vehicles, in particular, heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" and tanks "Panther"). For its part, the Soviet command used these two months of respite, on the one hand, to strengthen the defense near Kursk, turning the city into a real fortress. According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Headquarters made a decision "on the need to build a strong, deeply echeloned defense in all the most important directions, and first of all in the area of the Kursk salient. In this regard, the front commanders were given the appropriate instructions. The troops began to dig deeper into the ground. It was decided not to introduce the strategic reserves of the Headquarters that were being formed and prepared, concentrating them closer to the most dangerous areas. Thus, already in mid-April, the Headquarters made a preliminary decision on a deliberate defense."

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On the other hand, it was decided to prepare three connected counteroffensives, on Orel, Kharkov and Donbass, which were supposed to work after the enemy finally ran out of steam near Kursk.
By July 1943, the active Red Army consisted of over 6.6 million people, 105,000 guns and mortars, about 2,200 combat units of field rocket artillery, more than 10,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 10,300 combat aircraft. On the German side, 50 divisions were concentrated to carry out the planned operation against the Kursk salient, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, 11 tank battalions and assault gun divisions*, which numbered up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns and over 2,000 aircraft (almost 69% of all combat aircraft in the East). Over 900,000 people were ready for combat.

In general, by the summer of 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, our armed forces were superior to the Nazi troops in both quantity and quality.
GEORGY ZHUKOV
Marshal of the Soviet Union

The Battle of Kursk consists of four interconnected operations, stretched over 750 km, which lasted for 50 days.
The first attack was carried out by the Nazis (Operation Citadel). These were attacks from north to south from Orel and from south to north from Kharkov (Army Group South). The first attack resulted in the Germans successfully breaking through 30 km into the Soviet defenses, but this attack stalled by July 11. In the second attack, the Germans advanced 50 km, but this attack also stopped on July 16.
This double failure of the Nazis was explained by the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensives.
The first was Operation Kutuzov. This was an attack on Orel on July 12, which forced General Model to retreat. The second is Operation Donbass, which began on July 17 and forced Hitler, who wanted to keep the "Soviet Ruhr" at any cost, to stop Field Marshal Manstein's tanks. The third is Operation General Rumyantsev, which began on August 3.

* Assault guns were specialized armored self-propelled artillery units.

Well, the liberation of Kharkov on August 23, 1943, closed the battle that went down in history as Kursk.

The largest tank battle of the Second World War took place near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943.

The Battle of Prokhorovka was a battle between units of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It took place on July 12, 1943, on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge (Belgorod direction) in the Voronezh Front zone, in the area of Prokhorovka station.

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The Nazis outnumbered us in the number of combat vehicles, especially heavy ones. But the armored fascist armada encountered the greatest heroism of Soviet soldiers and screeched to a halt, drenched in the blood of its soldiers and officers, suffocating in fire and smoke. The damage to the enemy was enormous. On July 12 alone, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and lost more than 10 thousand people killed. But even at the cost of such sacrifices, the fascists did not achieve their goal: their strength encountered our invincible power. We also lost quite a few tanks, especially light ones...
PAVEL ROTMISTROV
Soviet General

The wounded did not leave the battlefield, tank crews who had lost their combat vehicles fought on foot, anti-tank gun crews fought to the last man...
PAVEL ROTMISTROV
Soviet General

P.A. Rotmistrov (later Marshal of Armored Troops) claimed that on July 12 alone, in battles with his army, "the enemy lost over 350 tanks." And General N.F. Vatutin spoke of the greatest heroism of Soviet soldiers who fought to the death. According to his data, in just one day of battle, the Nazis lost 11,000 soldiers and officers, as well as 230 tanks and self-propelled guns.

As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for defensive actions on the Eastern Front, as well as for organizing defense in the West in case of an airborne assault, which the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question. It goes without saying that the Russians hastened to exploit their success. And there were no more quiet days on the Eastern Front. The initiative had completely passed to the enemy.
HEINZ WILHELM GUDERIAN
Colonel General of the German Army

The Battle of Kursk. A Radical Turning Point in the War (2020).

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ON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE
The Battle of Kursk is considered to be the turning point of the Great Patriotic War. After Kursk, the German
military machine could no longer recover and had no chance of winning.
By April 1943, a relative lull had set in in the Kursk area, which the parties used to build up their forces and prepare for an offensive. On April 12, 1943, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to defend the Kursk sector. In turn, on April 15, the Nazi command signed a directive to carry out Operation Citadel. The plan for the operation involved launching two counterattacks from the south and north at the base of the Soviet salient and the subsequent encirclement of Soviet troops. The Germans placed great hopes on the mass use of new types of equipment - medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V "Panther", T-VI "Tiger", assault guns "Ferdinand" ("Elephant"). These models had improved armor protection and artillery weapons of 75 mm and 88 mm caliber.
According to the directives of the Headquarters, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts prepared powerful echeloned defensive positions, the depth of which exceeded 100 km, by the beginning of the German offensive. Several defense lines were prepared, which were connected by a number of intermediate and cut-off strips.
Each defensive line consisted of a widely developed system of trenches and a large number of anti-tank strong points prepared for all-round defense, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields.
By July 1943, the formation of German strike groups was completed.

KURSK DEFENSIVE OPERATION
On July 1, 1943, at a meeting at Headquarters, Hitler confirmed his decision to carry out Operation Citadel and named the start date of the operation - July 5.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive. The Germans avoided an offensive over rough terrain and near Soviet fortified positions, and therefore advanced along existing roads. During July 5-9, fierce battles took place in the Oboyan and Korocha directions, the Germans massively used tanks in the offensive. The enemy brought about 700 tanks along the main direction along the Oboyan Highway against the 6th Guards Army of Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov, another 300 tanks were advancing in the Korocha direction against units of the 7th Guards Army of Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov. During the offensive, enemy tanks encountered fierce resistance from the Red Army. Along with anti-tank artillery, Soviet armor-piercing gunners bravely fought the enemy tanks. One of the German tank generals, Major General F. von Mellenthin, recalled after the war: "It seemed that every infantryman had an anti-tank rifle or anti-tank gun. The Russians deployed these weapons very cleverly and it seemed that there was no place where they were not." At some points in the enemy's defense, they encountered Soviet tanks dug into the ground, and only if the Germans broke through did the Red Army soldiers throw anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails. The Germans' expectation of a tank breakthrough did not come true - by the end of the first day of the German offensive, they managed to wedge into the Soviet troops' defenses only 3-4 km, suffering significant losses. In the following days, on July 7 and 8, the Germans continued their tank attacks, bringing new units into battle... The entry into battle of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov led to a series of head-on tank battles in this sector of the front. In one of the battles on July 7, an anti-tank battery defending a height in the Oboyan Highway area, having allowed an attacking group of tanks to approach to 200-300 m, disabled several Tigers in a few minutes. The remaining German tanks quickly retreated. The enemy attack was thwarted.

Another artillery brigade destroyed 35 tanks on July 8 alone, including three Tigers and one Ferdinand self-propelled artillery unit.

A large tank group of German tanks, having broken through the front of our troops, developed an offensive to the north in the Oboyan Highway area. The group was met and counterattacked by a tank brigade from the front reserve. Taking advantage of the terrain, the brigade turned around and opened fire on the Germans from the spot. The fierce battle continued until nightfall. The Germans lost 15 tanks and did not advance forward.

As a result of a stubborn and skillfully organized defense, the Red Army soldiers delayed the advance of the main German group in the Oboyan direction for several days, ensuring the necessary regrouping of our troops and inflicting damage on the enemy. Having lost several hundred tanks in three days of fighting in the highway strip alone, the Germans were forced to stop their attacks in the Oboyan direction by July 9.
On July 8, fresh tank units launched a bold attack on the right flank of the main German tank group advancing on Oboyan. To counter our attack, the Nazi command had to withdraw over 100 tanks from the decisive Oboyan direction, where fierce battles were taking place at that time. On July 9, the Germans, using the II SS Panzer Corps and the XLVIII Panzer Corps, made a new attempt to break through to Kursk along the shortest route through Oboyan, straddling the Belgorod-Kursk highway. However, this time the enemy was stopped. As a result of fierce five-day battles in the Oboyan direction, the Germans managed to advance into the depth of the Soviet defense by only 30-35 km by July 9…

The skilful defense of the Soviet troops, the actions of the Voronezh Front, and the losses suffered during the battles forced the Germans to go on the defensive in the Oboyan direction on July 9, 1943.
No less intense fighting was going on in those days in the Korocha direction... Striking in the north-eastern direction, the Germans sought to break through to the Korocha area, but also without result. On July 9, active offensive actions in the Korocha direction were curtailed.

Fierce resistance from the Red Army forced the Germans to regroup and change the direction of the main attack to Prokhorovka in order to break through to Kursk from the southeast. The largest tank battle of the Eastern Front unfolded near Prokhorovka. The Nazis planned to attack with two simultaneous strikes from the area west of Prokhorovka to the northeast with the forces of the group that had previously attacked Oboyan, and from the Melikhovo area in the northern direction with the forces of the III Tank and XI Army Corps.
During the offensive on July 11, 1943, as a result of fierce fighting, the Germans advanced to Prokhorovka from the west and from the
south.
At the same time, the fighting in the Oryol-Kursk direction was no less fierce. The area of operations was 40 km in size along the front and 10-12 km in depth.
As in the previous case, the offensive was carried out along the shortest route - the road. The German strike group consisted of the XLI and XLVII Tank Corps and advanced on Olkhovatka from the Pokhvalnoye, Tagino area.

On the morning of July 5, the Germans began preliminary artillery preparation, after which the strike groups, under air cover, launched their offensive against the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk, Olkhovatka and Gnilets. The Olkhovatka direction was the main one for the Germans. Heavy tanks were in the vanguard of the groups. By the evening of July 5, 1943, the Germans were successful in some areas of the Olkhovatka direction and managed to break through 6-8 km into the Soviet defense. In the Maloarkhangelsk and Gniletsk directions, the German attacks were repelled. To localize the German success in the Olkhovatka direction, the commander of the Central Front, Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky, ordered a strong counterattack on the enemy group that had wedged in on July 6. The counteroffensive was successful and seriously confused the German plans. In the following days, on July 7 and 8, the German command made several more attempts to break through the Soviet defenses and reach Kursk. The fighting was most intense in the Olkhovatka and Ponyri area. By the evening of July 7, the Germans managed to occupy the northern outskirts of Ponyri, but on the morning of July 8, they were thrown back by a strong counterattack. In two days of fighting, the Oryol group of Germans advanced only 6-8 km, after which they began to mark time, and then went over to the defensive.

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THE BATTLE OF PROKHOROVSKOYE
The culmination of the Battle of Kursk was the Battle of Prokhorovka, often called the largest tank battle of World War II. On the morning of July 12, the Red Army tank units launched a powerful counterattack against the Germans in the Prokhorovka area, which later turned into a counter tank battle.

After the counter tank battle, the battle broke up into a number of separate episodes along the entire length of the front. Attacks were followed by counterattacks. By the evening of July 12, 1943, both sides went over to the defensive.
True, in the period from July 13 to 15, the enemy still tried to encircle and destroy our units defending the salient south of Shakhovo with concentric attacks from the Belenikhino and Shchelokovo area to Shakhovo, and thereby expand the pocket formed as a result of their unsuccessful offensive. But all these attempts were unsuccessful.

In the Oryol-Kursk direction, on the morning of July 15, after a crushing artillery and air preparation, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front went on the offensive against the Oryol group that had penetrated the Soviet defense. As a result, the enemy's defense was crushed, and by July 17, our units had everywhere reached the old defensive line that they had occupied before the German offensive. In the Belgorod-Kursk direction, by July 16, the German troops went on the defensive in front of the entire Voronezh Front. On the morning of July 17, the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh Front began an offensive against the enemy that had penetrated our defense. After a series of successive blows, by July 23, they had reached their previously lost positions.

In accordance with your personal instructions, since the evening of July 9, 1943, I have been continuously with the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov in the Prokhorovka and southern directions. Up to and including today, the enemy continues mass tank attacks and counterattacks against our advancing tank units on the Zhadov and Rotmistrov front... Based on observations of the progress of the battles and the testimony of prisoners, I conclude that the enemy, despite enormous losses in both manpower and especially in tanks and aircraft, has not abandoned the idea of breaking through to Oboyan and further to Kursk, achieving this at any cost. Yesterday, I personally observed a tank battle between our 18th and 29th corps and more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack to the southwest of Prokhorovka. Hundreds of guns and all our available resources took part in the battle at the same time. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.
From the report of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky, on
the military operations in the Prokhorovka area. July 14, 1943.

ORYOL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION "KUTUZOV"
The German command, which attached exceptionally great importance to the Oryol bridgehead, which in its plans was the starting point for an offensive on Moscow, took all measures to ensure its invulnerability. During their 22 months in Oryol, the Germans transformed the Oryol bridgehead into a powerful fortified area with a highly developed and deeply echeloned defense, consisting of a number of strips, lines, and cut-off positions.
The main line of resistance of the German troops, 5-7 km deep, was a system of well-fortified strongholds and resistance nodes, adapted for all-round defense and connected to each other by a large number of trenches and communication passages. The tactical depth of the German defense consisted of three or four lines of trenches, in which open areas for machine guns and dugouts were located at a distance of 50–100 m from each other. In front of the trenches, wire barriers of one or two stakes, slingshots, fences on metal stakes, and solid minefields were installed, which were also present in large quantities in the depth of the defense.
To defend the Oryol bridgehead, the enemy concentrated a strong group of troops, which included the 2nd Panzer Army of Colonel General Walter Model and separate units of the 9th Army. The total number of German troops in this area was about 600,000 troops, about 7,000 guns and mortars, 1,200 tanks and assault guns, and more than a thousand aircraft. The troops of the Central (commander - Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), Bryansk (commander - Army General M.M. Popov) and the left wing of the Western Front (commander - Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky) were involved in the operation. The total number of Soviet troops was about 1,280,000 people, more than 21,000 guns and mortars, about 2,500 tanks, more than 3,000 aircraft.
The headquarters planned that the troops, having defeated the German group in the Orel area, would liberate the city and reach bridgeheads for an offensive in the direction of the cities of Bryansk - Bobruisk and Lgov - Chernigov. Four strike groups were formed to carry out the assigned tasks.

On the night of July 12, 1943, preliminary artillery preparation began, and then the bombing of German positions was carried out. At dawn, units of the 3rd and 63rd armies went on the offensive. On July 14, 1943, the advancing armies were reinforced by the 3rd Guards Tank Army. On the morning of July 19, 1943, the 3rd and 63rd armies went on the offensive again.

The successful actions of the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the Mtsensk area ensured the capture of the crossings over the Oka and the formation of a bridgehead on the western bank of the river, where the troops of the 3rd Army soon arrived. Then, under pressure from superior enemy forces, the Soviet troops abandoned the western bank of the river.
On July 25, 1943, the 3rd Army again crossed the Oka and took a bridgehead. On July 26, 1943, the Germans abandoned the Orel salient and began a retreat, putting up resistance on previously prepared defense lines. On August 4, 1943, Soviet troops occupied the outskirts of Orel. By the morning of August 5, the city was completely liberated.

On the evening of August 5, 1943, to mark the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, the first 100-gun salute of the war took place in Moscow.

BELGOROD-KHARKOV OFFENSIVE OPERATION "RUMYANTSEV"
The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was of no less strategic importance to the German command than the Oryol bridgehead, even after the failure of the German adventure - the offensive on Kursk. It was the strongest
"bastion of German defense in the east".
The defense of the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was carried out by the 4th Tank Army of Colonel General G. Goth and the Army Group
"Kempf" of General of Tank Troops W. Kempf, which were part of Army Group "South" of Field Marshal E. von Manstein. According to the most conservative estimates, the Belgorod-Kharkov group included up to 300,000 troops, about 3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 600 armored vehicles, and more than 1 thousand combat aircraft.
On July 16, 1943, the Voronezh Front troops went on the offensive, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and managing to advance 5-6 kilometers. On July 20, 1943, the Steppe Front troops went on the offensive. The general offensive of the two fronts, Voronezh and Steppe, began on July 22, 1943. According to the plan of Operation
"Rumyantsev", the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts attacked with adjacent flanks, bypassing Kharkov from the west. From the south, the encirclement ring was to be closed by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front. It was planned that the armies would cover 100-120 kilometers in 3-4 days of the offensive.

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, as well as the 57th Army, numbered more than 980,000 people, more than 12,000
guns and mortars, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1,500 combat aircraft.
The offensive began on August 3, 1943, after a massive artillery barrage and air raids.
On August 5, 1943, the Red Army began the assault on Belgorod. ... the Belgorod garrison put up fierce resistance, but by 18:00 the city was completely cleared of German troops. The Soviet command was building up its striking force, introducing new armies into battle.
Meanwhile, the Steppe Front continued its offensive on Kharkov, which was fortified by the Germans. The outer line of defense was located at a distance of 8 to 14 km from the outskirts of Kharkov. Another line of defense was erected around the city - a combination of stone buildings, barricades and minefields. The city garrison included weakened 7 infantry and 2 tank divisions. The assault on the outer line of defense by Soviet troops began on August 11, 1943, but it was broken through only two days later. Fierce fighting continued on the outskirts of the city until August 17, 1943. From August 18 to 22, 1943, the 53rd and 57th armies tried to close the ring around the city, but failed to do so. The 5th Guards Tank Army was also unable to close the ring, suffering heavy losses again. At Manstein's request, the SS "Reich" division launched a counterattack and distracted the Soviet command, as a result of which German units were able to escape from Kharkov. On the night of August 22-23, 1943, a general assault on the city took place. By 12:00 on August 23, 1943, Kharkov was completely cleared of German soldiers. The main results of Operation Rumyantsev were: the defeat of 15 German divisions, the advance and liberation of 140 km of Soviet territory. During the battles, German troops lost more than 10,000 servicemen killed, more than 32,000 wounded, and more than 9,000 missing. More than 180 participants in the battles were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Your telegram of August 9 gives me the opportunity to express to you my sincere congratulations on the recent very significant victories won by the Russian armies at Orel and Belgorod, which open the way for your further advance in the direction of Bryansk and Kharkov. The defeats of the German army on this front are milestones on the road to our final victory. W. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain to I.V. Stalin

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK
The victory in the Battle of Kursk secured the turning point in the war. In this operation, the German troops were dealt a severe blow. The exhausted German industry could no longer make up for the loss of equipment. The German command's bet on a blitzkrieg and superiority in equipment did not pay off. The losses of the German army in the Battle of Kursk exceeded 500,000 people, 3,000 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, 3,700 aircraft.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet soldiers and officers demonstrated those high qualities and abilities that allowed us to win in the most difficult war. This is courage, fortitude and mass heroism. Over 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 units and formations received guards titles, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev.

The battle in the area of Kursk, Orel and Belgorod is one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole. Not only were the elite and most powerful German groups routed here, but the faith of the German army and people in the Hitlerite fascist leadership and in Germany's ability to resist the ever-increasing power of the Soviet Union was irrevocably undermined.
G.K. Zhukov. Memories
and reflections

If the Battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the Battle of Kursk brought it to disaster.
I.V. Stalin

Toroptsev A. Strategy of the Second World War. Eastern Front (2018).

THE BATTLE OF KURSK
After the Battle of Stalingrad, the intensity of the fighting on the Soviet-German front died down somewhat. And the "front line stabilized." But what a line it was! Anyone who looked at a map of Eastern Europe in February 1943 could almost certainly predict and foresee the course of the main military events in the summer of that year. At the "Kursk salient," the Germans would certainly try to encircle the Soviet troops and destroy them, taking revenge for the defeat on the Volga. Both German and Soviet generals knew about the upcoming major summer battle, and the warring parties prepared for it especially carefully.
In this, the Battle of Kursk differs from all the previous battles of the Great Patriotic War. In 1941, the Germans used the element of surprise. In 1942, Hitler's strategists launched an unexpected attack in the south, took Rostov-on-Don and approached the Volga.
In 1943, the front line in the Kursk area was so curved that no other strategic decisions were possible either from the Wehrmacht or from the Headquarters. First, it was necessary to solve the problem of the Kursk salient. And already in February-March 1943, Germany and the Soviet Union began to prepare for a decisive battle.

... the USSR army was superior to the German army in all respects and by a lot, although it should not be forgotten that the Soviet army had many (almost a third) light tanks and more than half of the small-caliber guns and mortars.

On July 5, 1943, the German leadership concentrated strong strike groups in the Kursk area, reinforced by five divisions from France and Germany, as well as air units transferred from France, Norway and Germany.

The Soviet military leadership calculated all possible options for the development of the most complex operation, all possible twists and turns of the upcoming battle. Military experts claim that never before had Soviet troops created such a perfect, deeply echeloned defense, while having an offensive as their ultimate goal.

In Russian, the Soviet troops prepared for battle sedately, reliably, with a triple margin of safety. People sometimes say: "I hope nothing happens!" - about overly cautious people. That is exactly how - cautiously - Soviet people worked in those months, weeks, days. It is better to work. It is better to act for sure. With a triple margin.

These are the Germans, after all. They knew how to fight. They knew how to find the enemy's weak points. They knew how to use and develop even a tiny success. The Soviet people from Headquarters to the ordinary soldier and ordinary worker could not allow any miscalculation, and not even a miscalculation - a blunder, a mistake in 1943. Because the war had to be ended with a complete victory over fascism as quickly as possible. And for this, it was necessary to act for sure.

Military engineers, staff officers, and commanders developed plans for the location of complex defensive lines equipped with all means of defense, "the creation of an appropriate grouping of troops and the organization of a fire system." Leaders of various ranks organized the work of constructing trenches, dugouts, shelters, primary, reserve, and temporary positions, entire anti-tank areas with numerous obstacles... It was hard work over a huge area.
141,354 wagons of "supply cargo" alone were delivered to the fronts! This is work, work, work. In April 1943, 105 thousand civilians worked on the Kursk salient. In June - 300 thousand.
We give some figures only so that readers can imagine the volume of work done by the Soviet people before the Battle of Kursk.
The battle began on July 5, at dawn, with an unexpected move by Soviet commanders. With the first rays of the sun, a powerful artillery strike fell on the positions of the invaders, who were preparing for the first attack. Artillery preparation is part of offensive operations. This means that the Soviet military leadership did not rule out the possibility of an offensive until the last days. The artillery strike caused significant damage to the German battle formations, artillery firing positions, command and observation posts. The aggressors wanted to begin the offensive at 4 a.m. But after the bombing hurricane, they took 1.5 to 2 hours to recover. And only at 5:30 a.m. did the Nazis begin their offensive against the Central Front, and at 6 a.m. against the Voronezh Front.

...South of Orel and north of Belgorod, fierce battles began.
The 9th Army of Army Group Center tried to break through the defenses of the Central Front in a 40-kilometer strip with three attacks by tank columns in the directions of Ponyri, Olkhovatka, and Gnilets, and an auxiliary attack on Maloarkhangelsk. Here the armies of General N.P. Pukhov and General I.V. Galanin fought to the death.

The Germans threw 500 tanks at Olkhovatka. The Tigers, accompanied by Ferdinand assault guns, were the first to advance on the Russian positions. According to Guderian, the new combat equipment that Hitler was counting on was impressive in appearance, but had not yet been brought up to standard by the designers. This is a normal situation in engineering and design, in the production of complex combat equipment. Refinement, testing, combat testing, then more refinement, testing – this takes time, which all participants in World War II categorically did not have enough of.
A very interesting confession from a prominent German commander and military specialist! It says that the vaunted "German war machine", having captured the industrial regions of Europe, subjugated the economic capabilities of these countries, was unable to use either their economic potential or the huge corps of talented scientists, engineers, designers...
The Germans, of course, dreamed of the fastest possible refinement of new tanks, self-propelled guns, and other types of weapons, and of increasing their production. But the facts remain facts: the solution of these most important tasks was constantly stalled.
There were many "Tigers", "Panthers", "Ferdinands" in the battles at the Kursk salient, but not as many as the Nazis would have liked. And, most importantly, these mighty steel beasts did not frighten the Soviet soldiers.

A tank wedge was aimed at Olkhovatka: medium tanks were going into battle behind the Tigers and Ferdinands. Armored personnel carriers with infantry were moving under their cover. The most powerful blow of Army Group Center fell on the most fortified section of the Central Front defense. This means that Soviet military intelligence together with the partisans worked better.
In the Olkhovatka direction, the German tank wedge unsuccessfully bit into the defensive lines of the 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov four times. In the evening, there was a fifth attempt. With difficulty, the Germans wedged into the Russian defenses by 6-8 kilometers on a narrow section. They approached the second line of defense, having lost about 15 thousand soldiers and officers and 110 tanks.

On July 6, early in the morning, Soviet troops launched a powerful counterattack on the tip of the enemy tank wedge. The Germans withstood the onslaught. At first they retreated two kilometers back, but having received reinforcements, they attacked the enemy, returned to their positions, received reinforcements again, moved to attack, but the Russians did not let the enemy into Olkhovatka. The Germans were unable to break through the defense line here.
On July 7, the Nazis changed the direction of the main attack, attacking Ponyri. The Germans had 200 tanks and 2 infantry divisions here. Five attacks. Piles of corpses. Many destroyed tanks. In the evening, the sixth attack. Fresh Nazi forces broke into the northern part of Ponyri.
But already on July 8, the Germans were driven out of Ponyri. Several dozen Nazis were captured. Here they quickly lost their fighting spirit and almost unanimously declared: "at Ponyri, we realized how far we are from Kursk!"
On July 8, the Germans continued their offensive on Olkhovatka. They narrowed the width of the tank wedge to 10 kilometers and deployed two fresh tank divisions there. Fierce fighting unfolded in the area of the village of Samodurovka. Regardless of losses, the Germans kept moving forward. Soviet infantry and artillerymen repelled 13-16 attacks a day. The Germans advanced another 3-4 kilometers toward Kursk. And that was it. In four days of fighting on a strip 10 kilometers wide, their tanks covered only 12 kilometers, losing 42 thousand soldiers and officers and 800 tanks.
In four days of fighting, the Germans covered 12 kilometers. Three kilometers a day. The fighting lasted from dawn to dusk. That is, at least 14 hours. That is, the Germans advanced on powerful tanks at approximately 200 meters per hour. And only at the tip of the tank wedge.
Commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky, having completed the assigned task, retained large reserves, which the Germans no longer had. After all, the Steppe Front was still in reserve at the Supreme Command Headquarters.

General Goth's tank army and General Kempf's operational group under the general command of Field Marshal Manstein were advancing on Kursk from the south. The offensive zone was 40 kilometers wide. Tank columns advanced from the Tomarovka area to the Cherkasskoye-Oboyan line and to Greznoye. Another tank corps carried out an auxiliary attack from Belgorod to Korochi.
The fighting south of Kursk was so fierce. On the first day, the Germans brought in about 700 tanks. In the area of the village of Cherkasskoye, they surrounded the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment. The Soviet soldiers took up a circular defense. And on the night of July 6, they broke through to their own.
On the first day, the Germans advanced 8-10 kilometers. However, at night, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin, strengthened the second line of defense with the tank army of General M.E. Katukov, two tank corps, anti-tank fighter units. The tanks were dug into the ground to repel Nazi tank attacks.
On July 6, the Germans penetrated the second line of Soviet defense in a narrow area.
On July 7–8, they, ignoring losses, moved more and more slowly and stubbornly toward Prokhorovka. In the Korocha direction, they covered 8–10 kilometers in four days, and in a very narrow strip. On July 9–11, the fighting south of Kursk continued with increasing stubbornness on both sides.
In the Prokhorovka area, the Germans covered 40 kilometers in seven days. Marshal Vasilevsky proposed launching a powerful counterattack here. On July 12, having gathered large forces into a fist, the Soviet leadership began the operation. The Germans, repelling the enemy counteroffensive, fought extremely stubbornly. The largest tank battle in world history took place in the Prokhorovka area. More than 1,100 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it on both sides. Both sides suffered huge losses, and the Germans exhausted their offensive momentum. The Bryansk and Western Fronts went on the offensive.
On July 16, the Nazis began to withdraw troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. On July 18, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts began pursuing the enemy and on July 23 reached the lines of July 5.

Operation Citadel failed. Not long ago, the fascist leadership, planning this operation, dreamed of reaching Kursk from the south and from the north in a couple of days. It didn’t work out. In seven days, they covered a third of this route in the direction of Prokhorovka alone, leaving mountains of equipment and mountains of corpses on their bloody path.
Partisans from Belarus, Smolensk, and Bryansk made a significant contribution to the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk. In July alone, they carried out 1,460 raids on railway lines, putting about 1,000 locomotives out of action... These are the results of a great victory in a great battle.

PROKHOROVKA
The tank battle near Prokhorovka can well be called the apotheosis of the Battle of Kursk, but only with one caveat. Already on July 10, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin, knew about the concentration of a powerful enemy tank group here. The commander was preparing for a battle, the outcome of which also depended on whether the Germans would be able to pull up equipment and personnel from neighboring sections of the front to Prokhorovka to help the SS tank divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Death's Head" and "Reich".
N.F. Vatutin ordered the commander of the 1st Tank Army to launch a counterattack on the enemy, to keep the Germans on edge. Katukov's tankers coped with this task. But Prokhorovka!

At 6:30 am on July 12, "Messers" appeared in the sky over Prokhorovka. They flew there and back, made sure that there were no Soviet fighters in the sky, and soon their place was taken by dozens of "Junkers" - dive bombers. They chose targets, dropped on their wings and went into a steep dive, dropping bombs on villages, towns, small groves... Soviet fighters appeared in the sky, and
the "Junkers" got nervous, dropping bombs wherever they could, quickly turning around, running away to the west. Soviet pilots shot down several enemy planes, and they crashed into the ground, howling hysterically. And then the Russian bombers of the 2nd Air Army of Lieutenant General S.A. Krasovsky got down to business. Accompanied by fighters, they flew in even rows over their positions, delighting their compatriots, bombed the enemy positions, and returned to the airfields.

The pilots of S.A. Krasovsky were a great deal. Krasovsky was made a few days before the Battle of Prokhorovka, reliably covering the march of the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rotmistrov from the sky. The Germans, throwing tank divisions onto the battlefield, did not know that they would be confronted by such a powerful tank group.
Then there was artillery preparation. And salvoes from Soviet Guards mortars.
And then, as if by agreement, the Soviet and German tank columns simultaneously moved towards each other. The Germans raced to the east, towards the sun. The Soviet tankers had a more advantageous position. The sun did not blind them, but illuminated their path to victory. The hosts had another advantage - the excellent T-34 tanks. They were noticeably superior to the heavy German vehicles in speed and maneuverability, which played a decisive role in close tank combat.

The T-34s pierced the battle formations of the German tank divisions with a through attack and began to destroy the enemy's equipment from short distances. The Nazis did not expect that the enemy had concentrated such a tank force here. And they did not take into account the option of a through attack. Having collected several hundred tanks (up to 800) on a very narrow front, the Germans threw them into a breakthrough. And they could have carried out their plan, if not for the through attack of the Russians, if not for the close combat with tanks! The leadership of Army Group South made a serious mistake. The T-34 tanks in that battle convincingly proved that Soviet engineers created the best machine of World War II. But the miscalculation of the German generals still took place. During the tank battle, the Soviet military leadership acted more harmoniously and purposefully than the German generals. And the Soviet soldier defeated the German soldier here, as evidenced by the facts of specific skirmishes between tanks, companies, and battalions...

The tankers of the 29th Tank Corps of General I.F. Kirichenko fought brilliantly. The corps advanced along the railway and highway, covering the Prokhorovskoye field from the flank, where the main forces of the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Death's Head" were breaking through. The Germans did not get through here.
The commander of the 18th Tank Corps, General B.S. Bakharov, did a magnificent job. He built his units in three echelons and, attacking the enemy along the eastern bank of the Psel River, drove the Germans out of the line they occupied, dug in here, pulled up the second and third echelons, delivered another, more powerful blow... He dug in again, waited, and attacked.

On the left flank, the group of General K.G., created during the battle, acted clearly. Trufanova. She inflicted a defeat on the 6th German Panzer Division in a very difficult battle, throwing it back to its original positions.
We will not describe the twists and turns of that intense, multi-move, dynamic battle with the center near Prokhorovka. It is better to read about this in the books of eyewitnesses of those events. Let's say briefly: in the middle of the day (July 12)
"success in the main direction was clearly evident" (General P.A. Rotmistrov, commander of the 5th Panzer Army), and the front commander, as well as the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters A.M. Vasilevsky began to prepare for the offensive.
And suddenly, towards evening, the Germans brought in second echelons and reserves into the battle, and went on the counterattack. They again had a noticeable advantage in tanks. Rotmistrov, with Vasilevsky's permission, ordered his army units to go on the defensive, consolidate their positions, bring anti-tank artillery regiments to the front lines, repel enemy attacks, and at night refuel the tanks, "replenish ammunition, feed the people, so that in the morning they would be ready to resume the offensive."

It was extremely difficult to cope with such an avalanche of tanks, with the desperate determination of the Germans to win. Having routed the Nazis near Prokhorovka, having destroyed more than 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand enemy soldiers, the 5th Guards Tank Division held out, having lost a lot of equipment and manpower. All military experts claim that after the battle near Prokhorovka, the tension in the Battle of Kursk began to subside. But this does not mean that it subsided completely.

On July 13, 14, and 15, the Nazis tried to break through to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army from the flanks. They managed to push back the Soviet units. The guards of the 2nd Tatsinsky Tank Corps let the enemy tanks into their territory, squeezed them in a pincer movement and began to destroy them. The Germans realized too late that they were in a fiery pocket, lost many
"Tigers" and light tanks, and hurried back. Only a small number of tanks broke out of the encirclement...
On the evening of July 15, the Germans were completely exhausted. Silence reigned over Prokhorovka and the surrounding villages. The invaders were too lazy to even fire their cannons at night - they were so tired. They did not defeat the Russian soldier. The "Tigers", "Panthers", and "Ferdinands" did not help the fascists. The German generals could do nothing. And even the good summer weather did not accompany luck. Luck turned away from the fascists.
Before the Battle of Kursk, they still had some hope. Now they have no hope left of winning the war. Not a single one.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Prokhorovka_Cathedral.jpg
Cathedral in memory of those killed at Prokhorovskoye Field

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A bell tower in memory of those who died at Prokhorovskoye Field

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