Oct 14 event canceled due to “free will” per David Wilcock

[feeler]

Originally Posted by omnicentricity

Because it appears as though you are basically saying that:

- October 14th was supposed to occur according to a highly credible source
- you think David Wilcock offered a poor explanation for why the sighting didn't happen, because
- you think free will either does not exist or is a misunderstood concept, due to many external factors that you choose to see as more significant than your own choices

Is this correct or am I way off base here? Please help me understand, as this ineffective crosstalking of our last two posts is not really something I enjoy. Please remember we are friends here, seeking to enlighten each other

omnicentricity

1. Whether the source is credible or otherwise is purely subjective.
2. David Wilcock offered an explanation that, in my opinion, is not entirely complete (hence this thread).
3. My argument here is not whether the "will" is "free" but whether the "will" is "shaped" or "guided" (or misguided for that matter).


The issue at hand, as described by Alex Collier:

"As far as our free will as compared to the free will of other races, it is one and the same. It's just that we don't as a population have the realization of the power of our collective free will. We don't totally realize the sovereignty that our free will gives us. That is why they are manipulating us through belief systems in order to try and get is to relinquish our free will, by coercing us to use our own free will against us and ask them to come down here and control us. It's a choice." - Alex Collier

Additional reference from a differenct source (note: the key words here are "undermine" and "lack" in regards to the free will):

Coercion and manipulation undermine free will, on this view, in virtue of making agents not reasons-responsive. If Allison has been brainwashed to walk the dog at a certain time, then even if she were to turn on the news and sees that it is snowing, she would attempt to walk the dog despite having good reasons not to. Thus, manipulated agents are not reasons-responsive, and in virtue of this lack free will. [See Fischer and Ravizza (1998) for one of the primary reasons-responsive views of free will.]