https://richardheggie.substack.com/p...orism-in-china
Counter-terrorism in China
Global Terrorism
Since the 1990s, a volatile international situation has fuelled extremism and terrorism around the world. Terrorist attacks and related incidents have caused heavy casualties and property damage in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and other countries and regions.
Terrorism and extremism are rooted in political, economic and cultural factors and are not specific to countries, regions, ethnic groups, religions or social systems. The nature of terrorist acts and their perpetrators are diverse.
In 1990, Tamil Tigers massacred over 600 Sri Lankan Police officers. Bombing of the Bombay Stock Exchange in 1993 killed 250 people and injured over 1,000. It was master-minded by the head of a Mumbai organised crime syndicate D-Company. In 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh, a veteran inspired by extreme anti-government sentiment, killed 168 and injured 680. (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...rist_incidents)
The Russian Apartment bombings in 1999 killed 307 people and was allegedly conducted by Chechen terrorists. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 by al-Qaeda resulted in almost 3,000 deaths. In 2002, over 200 people were killed by Islamic militants in the Bali bombings, including 88 Australians. In 2019, a white supremist from Australia, attacked two mosques in Christchurch New Zealand with automatic weapons, killing 51 people and injuring 40.
In 2015, major terror attacks worldwide peaked at more than 15, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and at least a similar number of injured. Since then, the numbers of attacks per year seem to be diminishing. The absolute numbers of terrorist attack victims are small compared to the casualties of wars and natural disasters, however the fear of an indiscriminate terror attack engenders considerable anxiety for many people.
The fight against terrorism and extremism has become a global challenge. Over the years, countries and regions adopted different measures for preventing and combating terrorism and extremism, based on their respective historical and cultural traditions, their level of social and economic development and the level of education and nature of employment and occupation of their citizens.
The Iraq War (2003-2011) and War in Afghanistan (2001-2021) arguably represent the extremity of national responses to terrorism. They were instigated by the US and its western allies and ostensibly justified as “Wars on Terrorism”.
This article attempts to describe China’s efforts to curb terrorism in its own country. The subject is controversial and a full understanding is hampered by the oft-times opaque access to news and information from China and by the extensive anti-China misinformation promulgated by western mainstream media, particularly since 2017. References are provided to document the sources for the article’s content and facilitate independent checking.
Extremism and Terrorism Attacks in Xinjiang
Between 1990 and the end of 2016, separatists, extremists and terrorists plotted and carried out several thousand acts of terrorism in Xinjiang - bombings, assassinations, poisoning, arson, knifings, assaults, and riots. Hundreds of innocent citizens were killed or injured and several hundred police officers died. Assassinations mainly targeted Muslim and pro-China leaders. The property loss incurred was enormous. These events have been thoroughly documented. (China White Paper. The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang 14/10/2021
http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/e...4_9587980.html )
On July 5, 2009, “East Turkistan” Uyghur separatist forces inside and outside China engineered a riot in Urumqi which shocked the world. With what started as a peaceful protest, thousands of disaffected Uyghurs attacked civilians, government organs, public security and police officers, residential houses, stores and public transportation facilities, causing 197 deaths (mainly Han people and non-Muslim minorities) and injuries to over 1,700, smashing and burning down 331 stores and 1,325 vehicles, and damaging many public facilities. (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2...C3%BCmqi_riots )
In the following days, mobs of Han Chinese people took to the streets with sticks and metal bars, meting out revenge in attacks on Uyghurs. It was the deadliest unrest in China in decades, although the figures killed in the reprisals are disputed. The Chinese Embassy in Australia said the July 5 incident was a "serious and violent crime" that had partly been "plotted and incited" by outside forces and resulted in the loss of innocent lives. (ABC News 5/7/2019
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-...slims/11270320 )
The embassy said that after the incident, Chinese authorities "took decisive measures in accordance with law to ease the tension, protect local people's safety and property, and maintain social stability". A years-long counter-terrorism campaign was implemented to de-radicalise the extremists in Xinjiang. bring safety and security to the population and to prevent terrorism spreading to other parts of China.
Sources of Terrorism in Xinjiang
Extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwest China was primarily driven by the Uyghur nationalism of the “East Turkistan” separatist movement, rather than a strong desire for Islamist rule. Muslims in Xinjiang are predominantly of the Hanafi Sect of Sunni Islam, although there are others following Sufi and other branches of Islam.
Extremism was also influenced by the complex political and conflict dynamics in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly in converting extremism to actual terrorist acts. China’s global and economic emergence also encouraged a jihadist element into what had been largely isolated domestic, nationalist movements. (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Turkestan )
During the period of most active terrorism in Xinjiang (1990-2016), the grievances of non-Han ethnic minorities, particularly the Uyghurs, generally centred on the perception that the Uyghurs’ culture and grip on Xinjiang was under attack through a growing insistence on the use of Mandarin Chinese in the education system, limitations on religious authorities and practices, and increasing economic inequality.
The grievances may have been exacerbated by the massive migration of ethnically Han Chinese to Xinjiang. This began in the 1950s but ramped up considerably after 1990. This ultimately left Uyghurs in a minority with about 45% of the population. (Potter - Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications – 2013
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26270778 )
Ethno-nationalist mobilization and separatism became focused via the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was widely regarded as a long-standing terrorist organization and the most active organization then operating in Xinjiang.
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of new ethno-Turkic states along the western border of China (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). These states have ethnic and religious characteristics closely resembling those of western China’s long-restive non-Han populations and this also contributed to an upsurge in Uyghur nationalism.
The Chinese government was also concerned that the widely publicised student rebellion events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 would provide inspiration to separatists. Students were calling for greater freedom of speech, economic freedoms and curbs on corruption – demands that touched a raw nerve with the conservatives in the Communist Party of China (CPC). The top leadership was divided; while some saw students as patriotic, others saw them as a threat to the regime. The uprising in Beijing was quickly quelled with the subsequent number of casualties significant, but disputed.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...-china-in-1989
The government also immediately responded with control and repression of dissent and violence in areas of China where the risk was highest, most notably Xinjiang. A powerful campaign was launched to eliminate terrorism from Xinjiang before it could spread widely to other areas of China.
Initially, China’s security crackdown in Xinjiang forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and the other “Stans”. There they forged strategic alliances with jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Mujahedeen and the Taliban. The result was cross-fertilization between previously isolated movements, leading to the diffusion of tactics and capabilities that had the potential to substantially increase the sophistication and lethality of terrorism in China.
There is also evidence that agents of foreign nations participated in the training of terrorist insurgents and aided their re-instatement to Xinjiang to foment further unrest and instability. (Australian Citizens Party November 2020
https://citizensparty.org.au/special...stan-campaigns).
The CIA. for example, considered its earlier Mujahedeen training/arming operations in Afghanistan against the USSR a success, which could be replicated against China. Establishment strategists began to probe ethnic tensions in Xinjiang as a vulnerability. (Fuller and Starr - The Xinjiang Problem 2003
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...4OSMHdfZ2pr47x
The World Uyghur Congress and the separatist East Turkistan Government(s) in Exile (there are several) claim to be peaceable, but many of their leaders, as individuals and for their groups, have joined their efforts with terrorists. They uniformly oppose the Belt and Road Initiative, which is raising standards of living in China and abroad. (Australian Citizens Party – Australian Alert Service17/3/2021
https://citizensparty.org.au/sites/d...ang-series.pdf )
Control of Terrorism in Xinjiang
Excerpts from Communist Party of China Document #7 concerning the Maintenance of Stability in Xinjiang (19 March 1996) reveals the government’s intense and detailed planned responses (in principle) to dealing with the rising extremism and violence in Xinjiang. (Freedom’s Herald
https://caccp.freedomsherald.org/conf/doc7.html). These responses also provide insight into the CPC’s psyche, values and objectives (at that time):
“Properly and correctly resolve the conflict between people of every nationality. When resolving problems which occur between ethnic groups or within an ethnic group, adhere to the principle of seeking truth from the facts and resolve it accordingly. Do not resolve everything unselectively as an ethnic problem.
“Prevent conflicts between people from becoming an ethnic conflict. Clearly oppose ethnic separatism. Be vigilant against the very small number of people with bad intentions who damage our ethnic relationship.
“Legally fight illegal activities which damage ethnic unity. Religious problems will generally be treated as a conflict among people. Legally strengthen the leadership and control over religion and comprehensively and correctly realize and implement the religion policy of the Party.
“Take strong measures to prevent and fight against the infiltration and sabotaging activities of foreign religious powers. Restrict all illegal religious activities. Severely control the building of new mosques. Mosques built without permission from the government have to be handled according to registration methods of practicing sites of religion. Relocate or replace quickly people who are hesitant or support ethnic separatism. Give leadership positions in mosques and religious organizations to dependable, talented people who love the motherland.
“Stop illegal organizations such as underground religious schools, kung-fu schools and Koran studies meetings. Handle the illegal criminal activities of underground religion students according to the law. Register the people trained in the underground religion schools and sites one by one and tightly control them. Give criticism education to lesser offenders among them and punish the ones who have violated the law and committed crime according to the law.
“Take strong measures to prevent religion meddling in politics and other social affairs. Strengthen the ideological and political education of religious people and increase their law-abiding awareness and lead them to practice their religion legally. Let the religious leaders know that religious activities have to be carried out according to law, and that religion cannot be allowed to interfere with the administration, the legal system, education and marriage, nor be allowed to hinder production and the social order.
“At the same time, advertise the rule and orders by many different ways and methods and popularize them among people who practice religion. Defend both the right of practicing as well as not practicing religion. Forcing others to practice religion will never be allowed.
“A young generation of patriotic religious leaders who will defend motherland unity and ethnic unity has to be trained and prepared by systematic training and sent to China proper for visiting and studying in order to fully utilize the function of patriotic religious organizations.”
From a human rights viewpoint, the document contained some positive mandates:
The programme encompassed all nationalities, not just Uyghurs or Muslims
Resolution of conflicts should not always be based on ethnicity
Prevent any conflict becoming a (physical) ethnic conflict
Recognise that there is only small number of people with bad intentions
Seek truth and utilise legal means of action.
Defend both the right of practicing as well as not practicing religion
Forcing others to practice religion will never be allowed.
On the other hand, there was clearly support for firm and decisive action:
Take strong measures to prevent and fight against the infiltration and sabotaging activities of foreign religious powers
Restrict all illegal religious activities
Severely control the building of new mosques (ie those without government permission)
Take strong measures to prevent religion meddling in politics
Strengthen the ideological and political education of religious people
Stop illegal organizations such as underground religious schools, kung-fu schools and Koran studies meetings (ie those where radicalisation was occurring)
Register the people trained in the underground religion schools and tightly control them
Give criticism education to lesser offenders and punish the ones who have violated the law.
The CPC document, while seemingly proscriptive, actually gave considerable latitude to local enforcement efforts. It was protective of (some) human rights but was subject to interpretation in regard its practical implementation. It was clear however that the government anticipated strong and perhaps even harsh repressive actions would be required.
As a result, the security presence in Xinjiang became enormous, both in terms of manpower and spending. From 1996, the government tightened security with numerous “Strike Hard” campaigns against “violent terrorists”, “hardcore ethnic separatists” and “religious extremist forces”.
In parallel with the physical crackdown. the leaders in Beijing hoped that economic improvements under China’s Western Development Guidelines, issued in 1999, would dampen unrest in Xinjiang. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012-13, it was clear that even the significant investments of the Western Development program were insufficient for ending the extremist attacks in and from Xinjiang.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Western_Development
As part of the ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ strategy in Xinjiang, China widened the scope of security measures by increasing the presence of paramilitary troops, technological surveillance methods and collection of citizens’ biometric data. Suspects were rounded up and communication and mobility were severely curtailed. It also implemented mandatory ‘vocational education and training’ programmes to offset the growth of extremism, separatism and terrorism.
Xinjiang “bristled with police, military personnel, security cameras, and checkpoints”. Regular searches and identity checks became commonplace, as were shutdowns of the Internet and mobile communication networks. Movement between cities, particularly during restive periods, was often limited. There were widespread arrests and trials, prison terms handed down and executions of terrorist leaders like those convicted of planning the suicide car bomb attack in Tiananmen Square in 2013 (which killed 33 people).
Consequences of Anti-Terrorism Policies
It is difficult to be definitive about the nature and extent of China’s campaign of de-radicalisation and repression of extremists in Xinjiang, due to the limited “opening up” in China at that time (more than 20 years ago) – or any abuses suffered by the populace.
There is enough evidence to say that the counter-terrorism campaign was comprehensive and widespread. The extent of incarceration and other punishment is uncertain. It ranged from full prison sentences (even execution) for proven illegal terrorists through to full or daytime confinement to centres for re-education, de-radicalisation and vocational training.
The relative success of China’s counter-terrorism policies in Xinjiang and the remainder of the country can be estimated by comparing the level of violent attacks in China to the numbers of attacks in Israel, Russia, and the United States from 1989 to 2008. The level of violence in China was consistently well below that of the other three countries—a distinction particularly notable given China’s substantially larger population.
In particular, the focused counter-terrorism programme in Xinjiang appears to coincide with the downward trend in violence between 1997 and 2002. While re-education and employment programmes may have virtually eliminated extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang, accusations against China of Uyghur and Muslim oppression have fuelled militant recruitment elsewhere. According to some estimates, up to 5,000 Uyghurs have travelled from Xinjiang to Syria and Iraq to join various jihadist groups since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 (Nodirbek Soliev - January 2020 - Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26865754
The Xinjiang mass re-education campaign has sparked much controversy due to its scale and extra-judicial nature. In August 2018, United Nations (UN) human rights experts estimated that China was holding close to one million local Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities for “political indoctrination” purposes in what it described as a “massive internment camp” in Xinjiang.
The UN document, as well as extensive reporting in the West, repeatedly echo this figure of one million. Dubiously, it derives from virtually a single source – estimates produced by the anti-China zealot Adrian Zenz.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adrian_Zenz Porter and Blumenthal, writing on the Grayzone website (18/2/2021), dissected Zenz’ work and found “flagrant data abuse, fraudulent claims, cherry-picking of source material, and propagandistic misrepresentations”.
The number of one million is probably highly exaggerated but given China’s now-apparent success in virtually eliminating extremism in Xinjiang, the numbers undergoing “re-education” were likely to have been considerable. How coercive or abusive were the conditions surrounding the re‑education facilities is also open to contention. (Australian Citizens Party
https://citizensparty.org.au/sites/d...ang-series.pdf
In July 2019 an open letter issued by 37 UN member countries, influential Muslim-majority nations among them, supported Beijing’s “counter-terrorism and deradicalisation measures in Xinjiang” undertaken in the face of “the grave challenge of terrorism and extremism”. Responding to a complaint earlier that month by a UK- and USA-led group based on unsubstantiated characterisations of the Chinese measures, the governments demanded an end to the “practice of politicising human rights issues” (Australian Citizens Party
https://citizensparty.org.au/muslim-...njiang-uighurs )
Shohrat Zakir, the governor of Xinjiang, announced in July 2020 that the majority of the Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim groups held in ‘voluntary’ training centres had been released and ‘reintegrated’ into society. The governor also claimed that more than 90 percent of the discharged people had found decent jobs with local industries and manufacturing factories. The exact number of those who are still in re-education facilities has not yet been revealed.
The de-radicalisation approach adopted by China in Xinjiang can be contrasted with the regime-change efforts of the west’s Global War on Terror, launched by the US Administration of President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. While western countries had programmes of domestic Islamic de-radicalisation, these were of limited success, being constrained by western ideas of privacy, personal liberty and freedom of speech.
The western approach focused on repressing terrorists in countries that were thought to be providing them with encouragement or a safe harbour, In the Iraq War alone, at least 100,000 Iraqis were killed and 2,000,000 were internally displaced. There was massive destruction of homes, buildings and infrastructure. The widespread cancer-producing effects of 1,700 tonnes or depleted uranium incorporated in US munitions are only now emerging,15 to 20 years after the events.
In Iraq, Libya and Syria aerial bombardment campaigns and ground-borne invasions have destroyed nations and fostered the emergence of more terrorists than existed before.
The negative consequences of China’s counter-terrorism initiatives were certainly far less damaging to people or property. By most accounts they were successful. China reports that there were no terrorist attacks in the Xinjiang region for five consecutive years since 2017 and the social security situation economic conditions have fundamentally improved with the rights to life and development of people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang well protected.
(PRC Foreign Affairs 8/9/2022
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb..._10764087.html )
More than 190 million tourists visited Xinjiang in 2021. If human rights abuses were widespread, or if there was lingering resentment of the repressive counter-terrorism campaign, it would surely be evident on Chinese and western social media.
Re: Turmoil in China
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Bumping this talk, which reveals a lot more about the CCP and what is really happening in China, because the mainstream media's reports are very skewed.
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