The Multipolar World Order (yes, it's here)

[Ravenlocke]

BRICS News


JUST IN: 🇷🇺🇻🇳 President Putin holds talks with Vietnam's Foreign Minister, says trade increasing and relations "developing positively."

https://x.com/BRICSinfo/status/2026378021255483705

COMBATE |🇵🇷

Vietnam's FM in Moscow:

"Our diplomatic work is to defend the Motherland — from a distance, and proactively."

He met Putin, Lavrov, Medvedev, and Russia's Communist Party chief — all as To Lam's personal envoy.

https://x.com/upholdreality/status/2026377793819283682

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 1
US-Iran Conflict: The Impact On Russia
https://russiaspivottoasia.com/us-ir...act-on-russia/
The joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran have led to a deluge of media attention. In this article we sort out the reality within the Iranian and Russian trade and security ties, including their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Free Trade Agreement, and energy relations, the impact on the INSTC and how the latest conflict between Iran and the West may play out - both in terms of regime change and the varied, significant risks

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2028085078048571400

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/us-ir...act-on-russia/

US-Iran Conflict: The Impact On Russia

Published on March 1, 2026

As readers will be well aware from reports elsewhere, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, has attacked Iran. We will make some initial observations, but generally speaking will not be focusing on this conflict (as is also the case with Ukraine) for the following reasons:

Our focus is on Russia’s economic and trade repositioning towards the global south, not US foreign policy;
Conflicts are more than adequately covered in other media elsewhere.
We can however make some initial observations as regards the impact of this situation as concerns Russia and the current state of Russia-Iran relations:

The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement

Russia and Iran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025 for a 20 year period. The bulk of this document deals with the energy industry, and economic development related to two main issues: working together to deflect Western sanctions, and to enhance bilateral trade through common bilateral interests and Iran’s membership of BRICS. It also includes aspects related to defence and security, however this is limited to the sharing of intelligence, satellite data and joint exercises. There is no ‘mutual defence’ clause within this agreement.

It should be noted that when the United States and Israel previously attacked Iran in June 2025, President Putin expressly noted that Iran had not sought military assistance from Moscow.

The Russia-Iran Free Trade Agreement

Russia and Iran have a free trade agreement via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which also includes Iranian trade with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This came into effect in 2022, and reduced tariffs on about 85% of commonly traded goods to zero.

Russia’s bilateral trade with Iran increased to about US$5.3 billion in 2025, growing by about 13% over the year. Russian exports to Iran are dominated by grain and oilseeds counting for over 70% of the trade total. Iranian exports to Russia comprise agricultural products (45%), industrial goods (37%), and petrochemicals. The two countries set a bilateral trade target of US$10 billion by 2030.

Iran and BRICS

Iran joined the BRICS group as a full member on January 1, 2024, aiming to solidify trade ties with an alternative, non-Western bloc and counter-balance Western sanctions. This is of particular note as concerns primary BRICS member China, which according to Kpler Analytics, purchases an estimated 80% of all Iranian oil production. Iranian trade with BRICS has increased the past two years, although this remains dominated by China. Iran’s non-oil trade with China has also been increasing and reached US$2.5 billion in November 2025, suggesting that trade diversification is taking place. It should be noted that China also has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran that is heavily geared towards the energy sector and pricing.

Russian Investments Into Iran

Russian investment in Iran has increased since 2022, and during the 2022–2023 fiscal year, Russia became Iran’s largest foreign investor, contributing US$2.76 billion. This accounted for approximately two-thirds of Iran’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) for that period. (The Iranian fiscal year runs from April-March). Nearly all of this investment has been made into Iran’s energy production sector.

Iranian Energy Reserves, Production & Investment

Iran’s proven oil reserves amount to approximately 157 billion barrels, placing it among the top ten globally. Natural gas reserves are even more substantial, surpassing 330 trillion cubic meters—making Iran the 7th largest holder of gas reserves worldwide.

In 2025, Iran’s crude oil production averaged approximately 3.26 million barrels per day (mbpd), marking a significant recovery from previous years despite ongoing international sanctions. By late 2025 and into early 2026, output reached levels between 3.3 mbpd and 3.5 mbpd, solidifying Iran’s position as the third-largest producer within OPEC. As mentioned, of this production, about 80% is delivered to China.

Both Chinese and Russian energy companies are the most active in investing in the Iranian energy sector. Western companies have largely been excluded since the imposition of sanctions upon Iran in 1996.

Iran, Russia & Nuclear Energy

Russia is the world’s largest exporter of developing Nuclear Power Plants, (NPP) which it does so mainly via the state-owned Rosatom. Iran has long had an interest in developing nuclear energy, to wean itself off fossil fuels and to help provide additional capacity for energy exports, for example to neighbouring Pakistan, itself suffering from acute energy deficiencies. Moscow and Tehran have been in numerous discussions concerning the development of nuclear energy, including plans to build up to eight NPP in Iran. Doing so would revolutionise Iran’s industrial and manufacturing capabilities, with the spin off benefits of being able to export excess electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The official reason for the Israeli attack was information about Iran’s imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons. But Western intelligence services have not recorded any signs that Tehran is working to enrich uranium to a weapons-grade level or is taking steps to create a warhead. In addition, the nuclear power plants built by Rosatom, like most commercial reactors in the world, are designed to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which in its pure form cannot be used to create a nuclear bomb. Weapons production requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) or certain grades of plutonium.

The United States claimed in June last year that it had ‘obliterated’ Iran’s capability to create nuclear weapons grade material. Meanwhile, Moscow has stated it would be prepared to accept any Iranian stockpiles of enriched uranium it possesses. Iran lacks the reprocessing technology to produce high-grade plutonium.

The issue of Iranian nuclear energy and claims and denials of Iran’s actual nuclear weapons threat and capabilities are highly inconsistent from the United States position, with Presidential advisor Witkoff stating just last week that Iran was ‘a week away’ from being able to construct a bomb – suggesting the White House June statement was either inaccurate or the current attacks are justified by the claims – but actually based upon completely different objectives.


Iran & The International North-South Transportation Corridor

Iran is a key member of the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal, multilateral, developing supply chain that links Russia to markets in the Middle East and beyond. It extends from the massive Russian internal transport network to its Astrakhan Port on the Caspian Sea, traverses this and enters Iran on its northern Caspian Sea Ports. From there, containers are sent via road and rail to Iran’s ports on the Persian Gulf. From here, shipments are made elsewhere, including to other Middle eastern ports, East Africa, Pakistan and India. Routes also pass Iran eastwards to Pakistan and Afghanistan, although these areas are also becoming subject to regional conflict.

The INSTC route via Iran experienced significant, rapid growth in 2025, driven by a strategic push for alternative trade routes, increased cargo volumes, and major infrastructure advancements, particularly on the Eastern and Western corridors. The route has become a critical, cost-effective alternative to the Suez Canal, offering up to 40% shorter transit times and 30% lower costs.

There are some bottlenecks, not least the Rasht-Astara railway which is hindering rail connectivity from Azerbaijan. Overall, traffic along the INSTC Eastern Route: Russia-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran saw cargo traffic almost tripling in 2023–2024 to nearly 2 million tonnes. This trajectory continued in 2025, with India using this route for trade with Central Asia and Russia via Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. It should be noted that in 2024, India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) signed a ten year contract to equip and operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Iran’s Chabahar port as this offers India trade routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.

In other signs that the INSTC route is becoming a key part of Russia-India bilateral trade, volumes reached a record US$68.7 billion in fiscal year 2024-25, with non-oil trade expanding alongside the dominant energy imports. Key non-oil, non-mineral exports from India to Russia include engineering goods, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Examples of this trade, using the INSTC route can be seen here, here, here ,here and here; Russian trade with Pakistan here, here and here and Russian trade with Iran here, here, here and here.

The INSTC is also being developing as a key link to access East Africa, with Iran’s Persian Gulf Ports being augmented by Russian development in other Middle Eastern ports such as Qatar and Oman.

Iran’s geographical location make it an important, multimodal transport hub for both regional and international trade.

The Strait Of Hormuz

While not all the Strait are Iranian waters, Iran can deploy enough maritime security resources to effectively prevent shipping passing through. We previously discussed the strength of the Iranian Navy here. Closing this route cuts off energy supplies not just from Iran, but also from other regional key suppliers including Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser degree, the UAE. This is a key issue for Europe, as about 10% of the EU’s gas consumption and 4% of its oil consumption are from these markets. EU energy stockpiles are also currently low after what has been a colder than average winter season. Asia will also be affected – about 67% of its total energy needs are also from the region. China will also be affected, although it has three strategies it can deploy – negotiate with Iran to allow some shipments through, a policy of looking ahead and preparing (meaning it will have stockpiled oil resources for such an event) and crucially, increase shipments from Russia. As will other Asian consumers, regardless of what Western sanctions say. They will not introduce turmoil into their own economies just to support sanctions to support a conflict they have little or nothing to do with.

What happens next is the subject of some conjecture. Global financial markets open on Monday (March 2) and the price of oil will almost certainly increase, with values of US$100 a barrel being suggested. That is considerably more than the US$61 a barrel in January, 25% higher than the US$75 a barrel quoted last week, and way above the EU suggested price cap of US$44.1 per barrel it has imposed on Russian oil. A likely outcome for Russia will be increased demand from its major clients for oil, and rising prices for European consumers. A global two-tiered financial structure is likely to emerge with Russian clients paying less for oil than European clients do – as they will need to import more from the United States to make up any deficits.

Russia meanwhile has discussed, with China as well as with Iran, all possible outcomes and will have prepared for each scenario.

Motivations


The motivation for the attacks on Iran appear to be less about Iran’s nuclear weapon potential and more about instigating a change of leadership in the country. This will not be the first time that the United States has attempted this. In 1979, the US, together with the United Kingdom, arranged for the Shah of Iran to be deposed after he nationalised their interests in the Iranian energy sector and transferred their shareholdings to the Iranian state-owned energy sector. The resulting coup, instigated by the US and UK resulted in the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic regime in the country.

Given that the Iranian nuclear issue was apparently dealt with last year, and the fact that the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei appears to have been killed, the situation instead implies the change of leadership as the motivating factor. Western media is concentrating on this angle. That then implies that the Western energy sector is largely behind what is happening. With European energy foreign policy now firmly against Russian oil and gas resources, it would appear that Iran is seen as the solution. That suggests that further military action will be required in order to fully remove the existing Islamic government and install a pro-Western government instead. Such a regime would invite Western energy companies into Iran, sanctions would be lifted and Iranian energy supplies would flow to Europe.

However, this scenario is based on some very serious fault lines:

Precedence. As noted, this has been attempted before and failed – twice. Attempts at regime change in this manner were undertaken in Iran itself in 1979 and in Afghanistan in 2001. The situations in Palestine and Syria meanwhile remain wholly unsatisfactory.
China, India and Russia at this moment will support Iran. Although this is likely to be more in the form of military intelligence rather than conflict, their involvement is likely to delay any resolution.
Resistance. There is likely to be significant Islamic fundamentalism resistance, with Iran possibly able to call upon Islamic mercenary forces elsewhere. This could result in significant bloodshed and the prospect of a long war.
Initial Conflict Spread. Iran has retaliated and aimed missiles at US bases and assets in neighbouring countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Israel.
Secondary Conflict Spread. There are already serious neighbouring regional issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan which could additionally spill over into Iran. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has laid the blame for its problems with Kabul with India – another nuclear weapons state.
Ukraine. It is possible that a related issue could be to deliberately deflect attention away from Ukraine and to allow settlement discussions to take place without the need for that conflict to be so much in the media spotlight. We have already noted Ukrainian requests ‘not to be forgotten’ suggesting that some feel a side effect of the Iranian conflict could be an offramp for US involvement in Europe.

Summary

As mentioned, we will not be following the US-Iran conflict as Middle East security and Western foreign policy are not our areas of focus and it is more than adequately (how many sudden experts are there?) covered elsewhere. However, we hope that our analysis of the Russia-Iran axis will help readers understand the issues and risks that are at stake. We also hope that the situation can be peacefully resolved – Moscow, Beijing and Delhi will all be involved behind the scenes in a potential conflict that has the potential to inflict far more damage than the war with Ukraine.

Middle Eastern Oil Control Highlighted As Onus Falls On Russia & China To Unite In Response

[shaberon]

So far, I have noticed Russian news mentions, but does not get hyper about, the US attack.

China's Xinhua on the other hand is practically silent, except for a few political cartoons. They are not remotely favorable.


Sometimes I don't understand simple things. I'm not quite sure what this means:

The Global Governance Initiative (GGI) proposed by China could not be more timely, which quickly received support and responses from more than 150 countries and international organizations, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Sunday.

The GGI fully meets the common expectations of the international community and reflects the shared aspirations of people from all countries, Wang told a press conference on the sidelines of the ongoing session of the National People's Congress.

Wang said the most clear-cut signal from the GGI is that the leading status of the United Nations (UN) must be upheld, not challenged; the central role of the UN must be strengthened, not weakened.

"Without the UN, the world would be worse," the foreign minister said.

Creating parallel structures outside the UN or, worse still, putting together various exclusive blocs and circles is unpopular and unsustainable, he said.

As a founding member of the UN and a staunch defender of its cause, China calls on more countries to participate in and support the GGI, and to work together to revitalize the UN, defend the UN and make the UN stronger, according to Wang.

It means most of the United Nations, want there to be a United Nations, according to a Chinese side panel, leading us to wonder what they mean by "more powerful". As if the US and Israel would obey the prime directive. How do you "organize" that?

Does it move from New York to Beijing?

In terms of railing against Washington, this is about as far as it gets:

The U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran have exposed growing rifts within the Western alliance, as an array of European leaders spoke out against the war and urged "European solidarity" in face of U.S. pressure.

"No to war. Yes to trade, cooperation and prosperity," Spanish PM Sanchez wrote on X.

I can understand that China and Spain totally disagree with the violation of the Charter, and how does that help us?

When does a global consensus sway a demagogue?

[shaberon]

Similarly to the last post, this is odd and perhaps a bit conciliatory from Russia:

Now is the right time to implement Russian President Vladimir Putin’s idea of convening a summit of the "five" permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with Rossiya-1 TV channel.

"Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed quite a long time ago, even before COVID, convening a summit of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. It seems to me that now is the right time to implement such an idea," Lavrov stressed.

He added that Russia believes that the United States must clarify its plans to the world and how these plans correspond with the norms that previously existed.

"We proceed from the assumption that the United States must explain what its plans are and how all this corresponds with what previously defined certain norms," he said.

He's asking for an empty bag.

Nothing there.

Such a conversation might be possible if we undergo regime change.

Obviously, "explanations" are lies of the plainest sort.

I think they are being nice out of awareness that American people don't want this mess, are voiceless with a stolen future. By definition, however, foreign relations are the job of the Executive Department; and our weakness is that it operates with impunity. Especially since our Secretary of State is not an elected Foreign Minister, but, an Executive appointment. I would like to be able to get back with him on this, but never with a Republican-led United States ever again. At a minimum, that has to go.

[shaberon]

As I figured, there is more beef behind the "lite" versions of the brief publicized quotes I posted.


And, this is the point where you have to get over buzzwords like "global" or "AI" and other types of puerile rants used to sabotage dialogue.

There is a larger version of the proposal posted by China's Foreign Affairs 2025.

It is copied word-for-word with Russian commentary by Russia's Pivot to Asia. Back from last year, here is the extraction of the Russian response:

RPA: In a soft manner, Xi is essentially saying that over the past 80 years, the existing structure of the U.N. has become outdated and is now in need of reform. Certain members, over time, have become dominant, and this is no longer appropriate for the greater good of global needs. He highlights the failings of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as an example.

RPA: This section will be used by Western media to ridicule the GGI concept in two ways, firstly as concerns the statement about sovereign equality, and the Russian situation in Ukraine, and secondly, the concept of China preaching democracy. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine has come about purely because of ‘sovereign inequality’ and the treatment by the government in Kiev towards its own citizens in the Donbass, although people will argue this point. China is in fact partially democratic; its entire leadership has a tiered system of democratic voting, including all members of China’s National People’s Congress, the State Council and the President himself. This is the reality of China’s actual democratic structure often ignored in the West.

RPA: The concept of ‘international law’ is a strange one as it doesn’t really exist, apart from regulations voted upon and agreed by U.N. members. These cover issues such as recognising sovereign assets, governing international trade, and handling disputes. However, what has happened in recent years is that powerful U.N. members have bypassed the U.N. (and sub-groups such as the WTO and WHO) and agreed regulations and proceeded on their own whims as they regard unilaterally appropriate. Hence the explosion of sanctions, freezing and use of sovereign assets, even engaging in war. Xi’s proposal is that unilateralism must give way to multilateralism and a democratic governance system of handling international relations, whether they be positive, negative or require analysis. The full U.N, authority must be discharged amongst all members, politically unpopular or not, and cease to be wielded by members states acting on their own, externally from the U.N. structure.

RPA: Xi here is essentially referring to international trade, and the underpinning of this by a governance system. Such a platform would, for example, prevent the United States – or anyone else – from disrupting global supply chains by the sudden imposition of tariffs and sanctions.

RPA: The recent situation as regards the Palestinian people springs to mind here. Their application to become a recognised state at the UN was consistently blocked by the United States, Israel and European nations. Now we have seen the result – without UN representation Palestine as a nation has become so degraded and so many people killed that as the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov has pointed out “By the time they get to make a resolution about Palestine, there will be nothing left to make any resolution about”. Palestine had a population of 5 million people, who should have been under U.N. protection. The fact that they weren’t is a betrayal of U.N. values.

RPA: Xi makes an important point here and a salient one as regards the European Union, United Kingdom and to some degree, the United States. Their political administration structures have resulted in completely obscure reports, that often deliberately disguise or seek to confuse the public over the actual on-the-ground reality. Politicians are constantly remodelled, re-cycled, and placed into position of authority over responsibilities they have little experience of. Civil servants have become a sub-strata of an unelected political class. What Xi is asking for here is a more transparent, results-orientated structure. He also points to developing countries to step up and become involved in global affairs as opposed to maintaining regional conflicts and points the finger at developed countries to be more globally aware and embrace a less selfish agenda.

RPA: It is important to note that China does not seek to usurp the United Nations (although Western politicians and governments may spin it that way) but is seeking legitimate and much-needed reform. The problematic issue with this is that the U.N. has become Western-centric over the past eight decades – in fact it has been since its conception. But the world dynamics are changing. With the GGI, Xi is basically saying the quiet part out loud – that China – and the SCO/BRIVS alliances are seeking to create a parallel global governance system outside the existing US and European-led order.

The question here is whether reform at the U.N. is possible; or will it continue to be retarded by the Western powers, keen to retain their influence. Xi has specified within the GGI what governance reforms are necessary directly at U.N level – he termed it a ‘Pact for the Future.’

The conundrum here for the West, and the United Nations itself, is how to react. They can ignore China’s suggestions and even ridicule them. But that won’t stop the attitudes of the developing world, who are more educated now than they have ever been, and are well aware of problems within Western attitudes towards them: the aftermath of colonialism for example in Africa. The identifying of black Americans as ‘African-Americans’ as opposed to just ‘Americans’ (one never hears the phrase ‘Euro-Americans’) smacks of exclusivity, not inclusivity.

This means that the U.N. will cease to become relevant, or even important as a global development institution if it continues to exclude the World majority. If so, this will have been because it will have proven unable to reform. In which case, China is developing models to replace it.

Preferably, Western social academics, including those who monitor human social structures, lawyers, bankers, financiers, scientists, and other related professions can be persuaded to look at the GGI and the other institutional reforms presented by China in a serious attempt to change the U.N., and its inherent polices. If so, then great, East and West can reconcile. If not, China has a ready-made model to take the East and developing Global South forward – and leave the Western portion of the United Nations behind.

Because, since then, the worst possible step has been taken, this is from RPA in the past week. It's not just Iran, but, that "progress of humanity" -- the interconnection of Central Asia with north and south -- is suspended:

This could very well be the reason why both Russia and China are keeping a low profile. With virtually all the northern shores of the Indian Ocean turned into a conflict zone, including the passages along the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the overland China-Russia-Europe route and its maritime counterpart along the Arctic coastline as of now are the only conflict-free, timely options for traders and transporters—whether they carry containers, cars, grain, metals, oil, or liquid gas. The consequence is soaring transportation costs, making America’s competitors less competitive in the global marketplace.

This brings us to the very heart of the issue at stake. The move to subdue Iran, plotted in Washington for decades and now carried out together with the USA’s mercenary ally Israel, has striking similarities with the way the Americans went out to take hold of Venezuela, starting with oil boycotts, while ‘diplomatic’ talks took place to distract attention away from what was about to happen. These ‘discussions’ were followed by illegal attacks committed by the US Navy on oil, culminating in a US landing—an invasion—and the subsequent occupation of Venezuela’s energy infrastructure. The ‘Ground operation’ and the unprecedented abduction of the Venezuelan president were the final stages of the US campaign, carried out to pave the way for a more amenable local administration. Today, just a month later, similar operations are being carried out in Iran. A leader has been toppled, and the US military is now attacking the country.

Both Saudi Arabia and the Caspian states have every reason to fear that Washington wants to bring all the lands surrounding the Persian Gulf under Washington’s dominion, followed by the Caspian littoral states. Current disputes between Kazakhstan and its main American upstream investors, Chevron and Exxon, as well as Anglo-Dutch Shell and Italy’s Eni, are presently restricted to boardrooms and courtrooms, but political circles in Washington could well be tempted to use them as an excuse for more aggressive interventions.

This domino mechanism is meant to destabilize states around the world one by one in order to gain control on a regional level. Thus far, this has failed, but there is no guarantee that it might not succeed in the future. The only way to counter such schemes is to unite on regional and eventually global levels. It is therefore highly likely that Russia, China, and India will advance their cooperation in developing trade in addition to security ties. Much of the architecture is already in place; however, it can be expected that a reaction to the situation in Iran will accelerate progress.

It is prudent to note then that China has a non-preferential trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This means that tariffs can be altered at will and upon necessity between China and Russia, along with Belarus, in addition to Central Asia’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Both India and the UAE are currently negotiating complete Free Trade Agreements with the EAEU, with progress expected later this year.

All this points to a highly considered approach to regional security, contrary to what appears to be the United States’ (and increasingly Europe’s) current preference for attacking first and answering questions later. Globally, the West appears to see itself as making policy; however, this is increasingly carried out in defiance of the United Nations. US Secretary of State Rubio justified Washington not informing the UN of intended US and Israeli attacks on Iran by stating that the UN had failed to provide solutions, arguing that American leadership and partnerships were required instead to broker truces and bring parties to the table.

That is in direct contrast to the diplomatic position stated by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers, who discussed Iran by telephone on March 1. They stated that US actions “Represent a grave violation of international law and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter,” and during the emergency UN Security Council meeting convened the previous day, stated they would coordinate their efforts within the UN Security Council, the IAEA, the SCO, and the ‘Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations.’

These two positions imply that the United States will not necessarily abide by the UN charter, as ‘American leadership is required,’ while Russia and China continue to abide by UN protocols and to support the organization. The United Nations includes 193 member states. How the US position regards the global community’s views as all requiring American leadership and how many of them disagree will go a long way in determining the outcome not just of the Ukrainian and Iranian conflicts, but also of how the world reorganizes itself in the face of these types of statements. Neither China nor Russia is silent or inactive on the issue; however, it remains obvious that the resulting struggle between the concept of a United States of America and its allies – and the concept of a United Nations is only just unfolding.

Finally, a Chinese reflection on Fascism:

Marking the 80th anniversary of the United Nations this year, Fu said the international community should not forget the historical lessons that led to the UN's creation.

"Eight decades ago, the international community, based on the profound lessons learned from the scourge of two world wars, resolved to turn the page in history," he said. "This gave birth to the United Nations and opened a new chapter of global governance."

Fu said the GGI was proposed in this context. "It is anchored in five core principles, namely: sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centered approach and emphasis on real actions," he said.

Fu stressed the importance of safeguarding international fairness and justice. "We must never forget the untold suffering that fascism and militarism once inflicted on people around the world," he said, warning any attempt to "whitewash aggression, distort history, or revive militarism is an affront to human conscience and a threat to global peace and stability".

"We must promote the correct historical narrative of World War II, defend the victorious outcomes of the war, and safeguard the international system with the United Nations Charter at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter," he added.

Yes, of course. I personally add everything from history to WWII, but, learning about the modern aspect would be an adequate starting point.

I certainly do not accept this country killing civilization.

[Ravenlocke]

Pepe Escobar

MAKE TRADE CORRIDORS, NOT WAR

Flee the war dementia.

Watch the first documentary in the world in English on the connectivity corridor between 3 BRICS: Russia, Iran and India.

One of the KEY reasons for this war.

And considering how India just betrayed both Russia AND Iran, this might as well become the Russia-Iran-China corridor.

https://presstv.ir/doc/Detail/2026/0...lden-Corridor-

https://x.com/RealPepeEscobar/status...78522138898752

[Ravenlocke]

DD Geopolitics

🇨🇳🌍 While Trump builds military coalitions and bombs the Middle East, China just made its move.

Wang Yi announces: zero tariffs on 100% of African imports, effective May 1st.

Every single African export enters China duty-free. No conditions. No military bases required. No regime change demanded.

The U.S. is spending billions on interceptors, carrier strike groups, and bombs. China is opening the largest consumer market on Earth to an entire continent.

https://x.com/DD_Geopolitics/status/2031038058041380977

[Ravenlocke]

Square profile picture
Russian Embassy in South Africa 🇷🇺

🇿🇦🤩 South African Representative Wins Mrs. Title at BRICS Beauty Pageant

This year’s grand winners are:

🇷🇺 Miss: Valentina Alekseyeva
🇨🇳 Mini Miss: Dumalaog Saffira Kara Guille
🇿🇦 Mrs: Millicent Mpholodi Tlou

👏 Congratulations to all the participants!

https://x.com/EmbassyofRussia/status...29107400221009

RusWar

Mar 8
A Russian 🇷🇺 woman won the Miss BRICS beauty contest 👑.

The international beauty pageant took place these days in the capital of Tatarstan 🇷🇺, with 49 participants from 17 countries 🌍.

19-year-old Valentina Alekseeva 🇷🇺 became the winner of the contest 🏆. The title of “Mrs. BRICS” went to a 39-year-old woman from South Africa 🇿🇦, and the “Little Miss” title was awarded to a young participant from China 🇨🇳.

It was also announced today at a press conference in Kazan 📰 that Miss BRICS 2027 will be held in India 🇮🇳.

“The contest will continue, and we want it to become annual, with hosting countries being BRICS members 🌏. Next year, we already plan to hold it in India,” shared the president of MISS BRICS, Dinara Salyakhova.

#MissBRICS #Russia #Tatarstan #ValentinaAlekseeva #BeautyPageant #International #India #SouthAfrica #China


https://x.com/ruswar/status/2030728062556672124

[Ravenlocke]

Square profile picture
Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 6

Sri Lanka Eyes BRICS
https://russiaspivottoasia.com/sri-lanka-eyes-brics/

Sri Lanka has stated it is interested in joining the BRICS group as views it 'as a platform to spur its economic growth.' Neighbouring India is the 2026 BRICS chair and will host annual BRICS summit in late summer. It is possible Sri Lanka could be invited to become a partner nation.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2029888468055212077

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/sri-lanka-eyes-brics/

Sri Lanka Eyes BRICS


Sri Lanka sees potential BRICS membership as strategically appealing, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya has stated. She sees the bloc as a platform to spur its economic growth, saying, “We are a small country. If we want to meet the targets we have set for ourselves in terms of economic growth, then we need to expand our markets. Sri Lanka needs to grow beyond its borders. For that, we need strong collaboration, stability, and cooperation in the region.”

The prime minister said BRICS is part of Sri Lanka’s “strategy of strengthening regional and global partnerships,” adding that “our foreign policy in general is about collaboration, multilateralism, and strong cooperation, globally and especially regionally.”

Nearby India currently holds the BRICS presidency, with the next BRICS annual summit due to be held in September, probably in Delhi. India is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner. It is possible that Sri Lanka could be granted ‘BRICS partner’ status at that event.

Sri Lanka has also been discussing the purchase of Russian oil, with Amarasuriya saying, “Each country has the freedom and the right to take sovereign decisions regarding its energy policy and requirements. Sri Lanka will also look for the best options available that it can give its people.”

Sri Lanka has recently endured a financial crisis, which peaked in 2022, as acute shortages of fuel, food, and medicine spurred massive protests that ousted the government. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a US$2.9 billion four-year bailout program for the country in 2023. The IMF said in March last year that Sri Lanka had made a remarkable recovery from the crisis.

Currently, Russia-Sri Lanka trade turnover amounts to US$627 million, with Sri Lanka exporting approximately US$177 million worth of goods to Russia and importing about US$550 million. The relationship is expanding beyond traditional goods like tea and wheat into strategic sectors such as energy, airport management, and gemstones, and the two countries have set a bilateral target of US$2.5 billion by 2030. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Tourism, in 2025 Russia entered the top five countries in terms of tourist flows to the island.

Sri Lanka’s multilateral trade with BRICS is estimated to be worth about US$12-14 billion, with the bulk of this being with China and India. Both are significant investors in Sri Lanka.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 6
Russia, Central African Republic Bilateral Relations: March 2026 Update
https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...h-2026-update/
Russia's President Putin has met with the Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera in Moscow. The two sides discussed bilateral cooperation, including security, economic ties, and humanitarian issues, also signing an agreement to establish an Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2029885017879629985

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...h-2026-update/

Russia, Central African Republic Bilateral Relations: March 2026 Update

The President of the Central African Republic (CAR), Faustin-Archange Touadera, has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss bilateral cooperation, including security, economic ties, and humanitarian issues.

During the talks on Thursday (March 5), Touadera thanked Russia for its support during what he described as a “difficult” and “decisive” period for the country, noting that Russian assistance had helped ensure security during the December elections, allowing citizens to vote and choose their president. The CAR leader also expressed gratitude for grain supplies that had helped stabilize flour availability in the country.

Touadera said the sides would discuss further cooperation in energy, hydrocarbons, and agriculture, noting that the country currently faces significant challenges in its energy sector and financial system.

Putin highlighted prospects for humanitarian cooperation, thanking the CAR leadership for supporting Russian language and education initiatives. He also noted that Russia has decided to increase the quota for students from the African state.

Touadera arrived in Moscow on a working visit on Wednesday. He has visited Russia several times in the past and has met regularly with Putin. Their most recent in-person meeting was in January 2025, coinciding with the 65th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

The visit marks Touadera’s first trip to Russia since his re-election in December. He secured a third term after winning 77.90% of the vote in the first round. This month also marks a decade since he first took office, having been sworn in on March 30, 2016.

In February, CAR’s ambassador to Russia, Leon Dodonou-Pounagaza, said that Touadera was to discuss several issues, including the possible construction of a small nuclear power plant. He also said Bangui is interested in exporting coffee, peanuts, cocoa, and fruit to Russia. On March 5, the two sides signed an agreement establishing the Intergovernmental Russian-Central African Republic Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. That was signed by Russian Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov and CAR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sylvie Notefa Baipo Temon.

Reshetnikov noted, “We consider creating conditions for increasing trade volumes and diversifying it as a key task in the near future. We see great prospects for cooperation in the agro-industrial complex and mining”.

Diplomatic relations between Russia and CAR were established in 1992, while the Soviet Union first established ties with the African nation in 1960. Since then, cooperation has expanded to include political and military engagement. Although relatively small, trade turnover between the two countries has increased nearly eightfold over the past year, reaching about US$30 million in 2025.

Russia established a Russia House in Bangui last year.

Russian businesses have also begun exports of poultry as well as providing animal husbandry assistance to help improve food stock health. The partnership is centered on security, with Russia being a major supplier of arms and security personnel to the CAR. Russia primarily exports machinery, vehicles, food, and fuel to the CAR, while imports include an increasing diamond finishing trade, in addition to imports of various raw materials.

Russia To Honour All Hungarian Energy Contracts While Suggesting It May Halt Other Supplies To The European Union

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

South Korea’s Sinokor Shipping Company To Use New Vladivostok Routes

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/south...vostok-routes/

South Korea's Sinokor Shipping has added a new China route using Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. The company is the largest Korean shipper operating in Russia, with the new route taking in Busan, Vladivostok, Xiamen, Hong Kong, Shekou and Haiphong.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2030987886045397446

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/south...vostok-routes/

South Korea’s Sinokor Shipping Company To Use New Vladivostok Routes

Vladivostok Pervomaysky Commercial Port (VMPP) in the Russian Far East will begin handling vessels of a new regular service of the South Korean shipping company Sinokor at the end of March, the terminal has stated. This will be serviced by the Kobe Trader container ship, which has a capacity of 1,091 TEU. It will serve the maritime route Haiphong (Vietnam) – Shekou (China) – Hong Kong – Xiamen (China) – Busan (South Korea) – Vladivostok. The start of the voyage is planned for 19 March; the vessel is expected at the VMPP terminal on 29 March.

Sinokor has been working in Russia since 2008 and opened a representative office in Vladivostok in 2018. Today, Sinokor vessels in Russia operate on regular routes from Asian ports to Vladivostok, calling at four container terminals: in addition to the VMPP, the company’s routes pass through Vladivostok Sea Fish Port, Pacific Logistics Terminal, and Vladivostok Sea Pervomaysky Port.

In 2023, Sinokor announced the start of regular transportation through the port of Novorossiysk; however, in June 2024, it suspended operations in the Black Sea, citing an adjustment to the company’s business plan.

According to InfraNews, 7 Sinikor vessels with a total capacity of about 11,000 TEU are currently operating on regular voyages to Russia. In 2025, in terms of the total capacity of linear services, the company is among the top three leaders among maritime container carriers operating in Russia.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 8
Russian Far East Port Gains Permission To Export Fish To Brazil

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...ish-to-brazil/
Russia's Vladivostok-based Vladmorrybport has won permission to export Pollock to Brazil with the first shipment being prepared.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2030616960594251851

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...ish-to-brazil/

Russian Far East Port Gains Permission To Export Fish To Brazil

Russia’s Vladivostok Sea Fishing Port (Vladmorrybport), the largest stevedoring company in the Russian Far East for transshipping fish, has obtained permission to export fish products to Brazil, the company has said, after it passed the certification of the Brazilian Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply Ministry.

Vladmorrybport stated that “Specialists from Rosselkhoznadzor [the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance] have confirmed that our technical equipment and quality control system fully comply with the strict requirements of the South American market. Brazil is a promising importer of fish products from Russia, and now Russian pollock (and this is the main demand of the market) will go through our infrastructure. We are already working with China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Nigeria, Canada, and many other countries. Now Brazil is on this list. We are preparing for the first shipments to South America.”

Fish supplies from Primorye Krai to Brazil were not previously carried out, meaning Brazil is a new market for the Russian Far East.

Vladivostok Sea Fishing Port is a universal transshipment complex. The port’s total capacity for transshipping fish products is 620,000 tonnes per year. The port shipped 340,000 tonnes of fish products in 2025.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 8
Mongolia Chooses Main Cross-Border Route For Eurasian Economic Union Trade

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/mongo...c-union-trade/
Mongolia has determined which of its cross-border routes to Russia will handle the bulk of Mongolia-Eurasian Economic Union multilateral trade and is working on expending facilities to cope with demand. The related free trade agreement should be ratified later this year.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2030621822761476583

Mongolia Chooses Main Cross-Border Route For Eurasian Economic Union Trade

Mongolia wants to make the route through the Altanbulag checkpoint on the border with Russia the main export and import artery for its trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Mongolian Parliament Speaker, Nyam-Osor Uchral, has said.

He stated that “The implementation of this agreement will directly affect the activities of the Altanbulag Economic Free Zone. This covers 500 hectares in the Altanbulag district and needs to build a freight terminal, customs lab, internal roads, and communications infrastructure.”

He added that “The Altanbulag district economy, plus the surrounding region, is oriented toward exporting livestock products. The trade agreement with the EAEU will make it possible to diversify livestock farmers’ incomes, boost prices for livestock products, and diversify income from the country’s agriculture sector as a whole.”

The Altanbulag border crossing in Mongolia is located on the Ulan-Ude-Ulaanbaatar highway near the Russian city of Kyakhta, 233 km from the capital of Buryatia. The border region is a free economic zone, the residents of which include companies from various regions of Russia.

In addition to Altanbulag, there are ten operating road and two railway crossings on the border between Mongolia and Russia. These include crossings into Mongolia from the Altai Republic, Tuva, Buryatia, and the Transbaikal Territory. Russia is the only EAEU country with which Mongolia shares a border.




The EAEU and Mongolia signed a free trade agreement in June 2025. The document reduces or eliminates duties on 367 commodity subitems for each party, including Mongolia as well as Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. These cover about US$2 billion worth, or more than 90% of EAEU exports to Mongolia, enabling EAEU companies to save up to US$100 million annually. The agreement is also expected to help Mongolia to increase exports to the EAEU market by 25%.

The agreement has an initial duration of three years with an option for subsequent extension. It has already been ratified in Mongolia, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and must still be ratified by the other EAEU countries, with this expected to be completed by mid-2026.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 8

Decision Made To Send Russian LNG Supplies Earmarked For Europe To Growth Markets In Asia

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/decis...rkets-in-asia/
Russia has made the decision to redirect most of its EU-bound LNG supplies to Asia ahead of the EU's planned 2027 termination as it wishes to develop new markets instead of concentrate on declining markets. It is unfortunate for the EU that this also coincides with EU energy supply chain problems with the Middle East.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2030628774367449356

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/decis...rkets-in-asia/

Decision Made To Send Russian LNG Supplies Earmarked For Europe To Growth Markets In Asia

Russian companies will redirect part of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) currently being supplied to European markets to other markets, without waiting for the EU’s import ban to take effect, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.

He has said that “In accordance with President Putin’s instructions, we have worked through this issue and discussed in detail the current situation and the possibilities of redirecting Russian gas supplies. A decision was made that part of the LNG currently supplied to Europe will be redirected to other markets where constructive, pragmatic relations are being built with Russia, where there is demand, and where there is the opportunity to conclude long-term contracts.”

Novak added that new contracts may be signed with companies from China, India, the Philippines, and Thailand, and noted that market forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region pointed to long-term growth in demand, which is also backed by data showing economic growth rates higher than the global average, meaning growth opportunities are superior.

Country/Region 2026 GDP Growth World Bank Forecast
European Union 0.9%
ASEAN 4.7%
China 4.4%
India. 7.0%

Novak said, “We plan to supply global energy markets, primarily those countries interested in Russian gas and planning to build long-term, constructive relationships with us. These opportunities exist—our companies have confirmed this, and they are already in negotiations.”

President Putin had earlier said that “Other markets are opening up, and it might be more advantageous for Russia to halt shipments to the European market right now and go to these markets and gain a foothold there. I want to be clear on this: there’s no political agenda. But if the Europeans close themselves to us anyway next month, it is better planning for us to halt LNG supplies immediately and go to countries that are reliable partners and gain a foothold there.”

The European Union’s Position

In October 2025, the European Union adopted the 19th package of sanctions against Russia, which includes a ban on LNG purchases. The first stage comes into effect on April 25 and applies to yearly contracts. A full embargo is expected to take effect on January 1, 2027. In addition, the EU adopted a directive banning imports of Russian gas, including a ban on LNG imports under short-term contracts that takes effect on April 25 and a ban on pipeline gas supplies under short-term contracts taking effect on June 17.

Long-term contracts for pipeline gas supplies concluded before June 17 last year that have not been amended; their execution is permitted until September 30, 2027. Contracts for LNG supplies would be valid until January 1, 2027. As concerns pipeline gas, a permit may be extended for another month if a particular country fails to fill its storage facilities to the required level. In this case, it will be required to notify the European Commission no later than September 15, 2027.

It is unfortunate for the European Union that it has been affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has resulted in a cessation of LNG imports from the Middle East. The EU is believed to have LNG reserves that will last it until early April; however, shortages can be expected to result in rationing of use before then if the Iran situation is not resolved by then. EU LNG prices have risen by 45% since March 1st, with some predictions this could be as much as 80% by the end of this week.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 4

Russia’s EkoNiva Sells Dried Milk To Algeria For The First Time

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...he-first-time/
Russia's EkoNiva has been expanding its exports and selling non-fat dried milk products to Algeria for the first time. Russian exporters have been increasingly active in reaching out to new markets, and especially in the MENA region.

[url]https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2029165528334336239

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...he-first-time/

Russia’s EkoNiva Sells Dried Milk To Algeria For The First Time

The increasingly confident moves by Russian exporters to seek out new markets has gained another pioneer with Russian milk producer EkoNiva Group, which began exporting dried fat-free milk to non-CIS countries in autumn last year, shipping its first batch of the product to Algeria.

The company said that the batch was designated for a local Algerian producer of ready-to-eat dairy products, is preparing another larger batch for export to the same buyer and intends to regularly export to the country.

In other markets, this February, EkoNiva shipped its second batch of dried fat-free milk to the UAE, to which it first began exports in October last year with a 50-tonne batch of the product. The company stated that “Our task for the coming months is to arrange regular exports and grow export volumes. We are also in discussions with our partner company on opportunities for exporting dried milk to Qatar and Saudi Arabia.”

Dried fat-free milk is used to produce ice cream, sour cream, curd cheese and yoghurts. It is also one of the basic components in baby foods.

EkoNiva began testing out dried fat-free milk exports in 2023, sending its first batch to Kazakhstan. In 2024, it launched regular exports to Georgia and Armenia. From 2025 onwards, EkoNiva has been working to arrange dried fat-free milk exports to non-CIS countries and intends to open up new supply routes.

Non-fat dry milk (NFDM) is a versatile, long-lasting pantry staple used to fortify nutrition, enhance texture, and extend shelf life in cooking and baking. It acts as a direct substitute for fluid milk in recipes, a creamy addition to soups, smoothies, and coffee, and a stabilizer in dairy products, desserts, and bakery goods.

The company has farms and processing plants in 13 Russian regions, including the Voronezh, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Orenburg, Ryazan, Samara, and Tyumen regions, as well as in the Altai territory, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. Its main dairy division unites 42 modern livestock complexes, including those under construction. It has over 250,000 head of cattle on average, of which half are forage-fed cows. In 2025, the group produced 1.45 million tonnes of raw milk in physical weight, up 7% from 1.35 million tonnes in 2024. In standard weight, for milk with 3.7% fat and 3.2% protein, the figure grew 11% from 1.44 million tonnes in 2024 to 1.6 million tonnes in 2025. EkoNiva has also been developing milk processing since 2013, with five processing plants under its management.

The holding also operates in breeding, beef cattle, seed production, crop farming and organic agriculture. It owns 632,400 hectares of farmland, making it one of the largest agricultural landowners in Russia.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Latest Russian Fuel Price Increases & Domestic Market Trends

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/lates...market-trends/

Russian fuel prices have also risen due to the situation in Iran but are expected to return to normal due to replacement from domestic supplies. However there remain some Middle East supply chain and processing bottlenecks. We examine the supply chain trends.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2030993061938110626

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/lates...market-trends/

Latest Russian Fuel Price Increases & Domestic Market Trends

The situation in the Middle East has also impacted the Russian petroleum products market. The largest increase in the wholesale price was for fuel oil, which in one trading day became more expensive by 27.1%, to a maximum since November 2025. However, analysts note that part of the Iranian volumes of fuel oil can be replaced by Russian ones.

The cost of fuel oil on the St. Petersburg Exchange on March 3 grew by 27.1% to ₽19,910 (US$249) per tonne. This is the largest increase in quotes since mid-June 2025. To compare, the price in Europe for the same product has risen to US$793 per tonne.

Growth in Russian wholesale prices at the end of Friday’s (March 6) trades was also observed for all petroleum products. The cost of AI-92 gasoline grew by 2.65%, to ₽61,790 rubles (US$772) per tonne; AI-95 by 2.60% to ₽65,040 (US$813) per tonne; and diesel fuel became more expensive by 0.70–1.81%, depending on the class.

Petroleum product quotes moved toward growth after the start of the military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran, which has led to a sharp increase in global oil prices. The cost of Brent has grown to US$108.4 as of Monday morning (March 9) per barrel, the highest since July 2024. In response to the attacks, Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz—one of the key routes for supplying hydrocarbons. The volume of oil and petroleum products transportation is estimated at almost 20 million barrels per day (bpd), equivalent to 20% of global demand.

The Centre for Price Indices (CPI) notes that the jump in domestic quotes is related to the active replacement of Iranian volumes at Fujairah Port in the UAE—a key bunkering hub of the Gulf of Oman. According to Kpler, the suspension of fuel oil exports from Iran (about 256,000 bpd in 2025) can expand demand for the Russian product and lead to a greater increase in wholesale prices. The escalation of the conflict provoked global growth in quotes and laid a risk premium for transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been reflected in the Russian market, says NEFT Research.

The driver for the growth of wholesale fuel oil prices in Russia was also the attacks on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, according to Kirill Bakhtin, head of the centre for Russian stock analysis at BCS. This led to an increase in global oil prices and an increase in the margin of petroleum products against the background of risks of regular supply disruption, he adds. Bakhtin also points out that there are no damper mechanisms linked to indicative prices for fuel oil. The cost of fuel oil in Russia, he explains, is formed on the basis of an export netback while taking into account transportation inside the country. This means that a significant overweight in favor of any sales channel is not precisely fixed.

Fuel oil among export goods is distinguished by the greatest volatility due to the low liquidity of exchange trades and the absence of state sales standards on the exchange, as for gasoline and diesel fuel, according to Vladimir Chernov of Freedom Finance Global. The current supply on the Astana exchange, in his assessment, is limited and unable to satisfy the increased demand, which also spurs the growth of prices.

Andrey Dyachenko, chief analyst for oil, petroleum products, and macroeconomics at Proleum, in Dubai says that the growth of quotes is primarily related to internal factors — a reduction in supply on the exchange and the seasonal structure of demand. Fuel oil as a “residual” product is sensitive to refinery loading and changes in the processing structure, since during repairs the supply quickly shrinks, causing price jumps.

According to Russian Consumer Price Index data, in February Russia reduced the maritime export of fuel oil by 23%, to 2 million tonnes.

The freight market, analysts add, has not yet responded to the violent situation in the Middle East: the cost of transporting dark petroleum products in the last week of February decreased by US$1–2. That can be expected to radically change.

S&P Global meanwhile has stated that the decrease in shipments of petroleum products from Russia in February is associated with unplanned refinery shutdowns, which led to a decrease in processing for the month to 5.15 million bpd. In January, according to the International Energy Agency report, Russian petroleum product exports reached peak values.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Russia’s RZD Logistics Contracting Rail Transport To India and China
https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...dia-and-china/
Russia's RZD Logistics are reporting an easing of rail transport problems along the INSTC and are saying that trains servicing the routes via Iran are now being booked for the March and April.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2035677952759963967

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...dia-and-china/

Russia’s RZD Logistics Contracting Rail Transport To India and China

Russia’s RZD Logistics has responded to the situation caused by logistics logjams due to the conflict in Iran and has already begun forming departure schedules for the next two months along the INSTC. Despite the remaining difficulties on maritime sections, operators are now beginning the recommencement of land transport along the INSTC.

Dmitry Kryukov, the deputy general director of RZD Logistics, states that companies have already contracted trains for March and April 2026. According to Kryukov, it is possible to work out possible risks with logistical partners involved throughout the route. He said that “Questions with Iran are removed, we interact, and trains are contracted for March-April, despite geopolitics. Market participants rely on facts, not the emotional background in the media.” At the same time, he stated that serious restrictions remain in the Indian Ocean and that regional shipping there is greatly hampered.

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/wp-co...INSTC-Map-.png

The INSTC connects Russia with India, the countries of the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia through Iranian seaports, with all three branches of the corridor passing through Iranian territory. According to RZD, in 2024, the volume of rail transport along the corridor amounted to 12.9 million tonnes, which is 3% higher than the indicator of 2023. However, in 2025, the indicator decreased to 9.9 million tonnes. RZD carries about 1% of the total loading along this route.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 21
Russian Foreign Minister Meets With ASEAN Ambassadors In Moscow

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...ors-in-moscow/
The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has met with the Ambassadors of all of the ASEAN countries - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, in Moscow. They discussed improving Russia's multilateral trade with the bloc as well as developing relations between ASEAN and BRICS, the Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2035352256523231411

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...ors-in-moscow/

Russian Foreign Minister Meets With ASEAN Ambassadors In Moscow

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has met with the Ambassadors of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Moscow on Friday, the Foreign Ministry has stated.

They said that “A substantive conversation took place in the context of this year’s 35th anniversary of Russia-AEAN relations on the subject of advancing the Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership across a whole host of areas, including countering common challenges and threats, trade and investment, highly technological and research-intensive industries, digitization, the energy sector, and broader business and youth contacts. The main emphasis was made on discussing the organization of anniversary events and approval of a new manifesto document for the medium-term.

A substantive exchange of views on pressing issues of the international and regional agendas proved the importance of the Russia-ASEAN dialogue for the formation of a solid architecture of Asia-Pacific regional security and cooperation, based on respect for international law, equal rights and openness. The sides discussed the prospects of interlinking with Eurasian integration processes, increasing ASEAN’s cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and establishing ASEAN-BRICS contacts.”

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/wp-co.../ASEAN-Map.jpg

ASEAN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It has a population of 686 million, a GDP (PPP) of US$13.2 trillion, and GDP growth of about 4.6% in 2025. ASEAN’s total trade with Russia is worth over US$30 billion.

Of the ASEAN members, Indonesia is a full member of BRICS, while Malaysia and Thailand are BRICS partners. Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam have free trade agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union, while Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand are all in the negotiation process. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are partners with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In turn, Russia is an observer nation to ASEAN and holds annual Russia-ASEAN meetings, usually on the sidelines of the main ASEAN annual meetings that take place each year. Russia-ASEAN trade is rapidly developing, with a target to triple this to US$100 billion in coming years.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 20
Middle East Logistics Shocks For Russian Imports

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/middl...ssian-imports/
The Russian domestic consumer market can expect supply chain difficulties due to the United States and Israeli attacks on Iran. We explain the developing logistics bottlenecks, which products are likely to be impacted and expected price rises.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2034980193522393149

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/middl...ssian-imports/

Middle East Logistics Shocks For Russian Imports

Published on March 20, 2026
English
EN
Russian
RU
Military activity concerning Iran have escalated quickly from a regional conflict into a logistical shock for Russian imports. Two critical elements of the route came under attack at once: maritime transport through the Persian Gulf and air corridors from Iran to Israel. For the Russian market, this is especially sensitive because the UAE over recent years has become one of the key transit hubs for parallel import — from car parts and electronics to clothing, household appliances, and medical equipment. If the regional situation does not stabilise, Russian end-user consumer prices for numerous imported goods in Russia may increase by 15–25% for certain products.

The main issues lies beyond the Strait of Hormuz but in the destruction of several supply links at once. Shipping lines are avoiding Persian Gulf ports, airlines are suspending flights, insurers are raising rates, and cargo has to be carried by a roundabout way — through Oman, Turkey, India, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and other intermediate hubs. This means that logistics has ceased to solely about the optimal rate and is now a question of the physical availability of the corridor. For business, this means an increase in cost, lengthening of terms, and a sharp increase in uncertainty in the supply chain routes for which a significant part of Russian imports depend.

Automotive spare car parts and mass market clothing are likely to be the most immediately impacted.

The UAE Example

We can look at the UAE as an example. Trade turnover between Russia and the UAE in 2025 grew to US$12 billion, while the Emirates themselves are a main hub for parallel imports, with about 40–60% of alternative supplies to Russia (ie: not directly organised by the manufacturer) pass through the UAE en route to Russia.

Now, shipping lines are redirecting vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, which adds 15–20 days to the delivery time, while shipping rates have increased by about 30%. One TEU now ships for between US$2000 – US$4000 depending on the contents. Insurance coverage has tripled, while airlines are now introducing fuel surcharges.

The UAE has become not just a trade partner for Russia, but also a logistics hub with systemic importance. In 2025, trade turnover between the two countries included machinery products — car parts, electronics, industrial machines, ventilation equipment — were brought from the Emirates to Russia, as well as plastics, polymers, dyes, pharmaceuticals, food, and non-ferrous metals. The return flow included oil products, coal, fertilisers, grains, frozen fish, poultry meat, sunflower oil, metals, chemicals, machine tools, transport, and timber.

Since March 2022, a significant part of parallel imports also went directly through the Emirates, including items such as Apple products, branded clothing, car parts for brands that left the Russian market, household appliances, cosmetics, perfumes, and medical equipment. This is why the current disruption is perceived not only as a regional diminishing of oil exports from Iran, but as a blow to Russia’s parallel imports infrastructure and transit routes.

The peculiarity of the current situation is that the market is losing both maritime and air flexibility at the same time. The world’s largest shipping lines, including Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM, have suspended operations in the Persian Gulf. Instead, vessels are redirected through the Cape of Good Hope, (South Africa) which increases transit to Russia and other countries by 15–20 days.

Alternative entry points in the UAE — Fujairah and Khor Fakkan on the coast of the Gulf of Oman — work as a bypass option, but for most services, this is not a full-fledged replacement for direct calls to the Persian Gulf.

For Russia, this is important not only from the point of view of direct trade with the UAE, but because the Emirates performed the function of a transshipment centre for supplies between Russia and other regions, including Latin America and South Asia. Forty free trade economic zones and a highly developed port infrastructure are concentrated in the Emirates. Restrictions in the Persian Gulf hit not only bilateral trade turnover, but also global transit and supply chains.

Maritime

At sea, the cost increase consists of several components at once. Firstly, carriers have introduced war surcharges from US$1500 to US$4000 per container depending on the operator and type of cargo. Secondly, the long route through Africa increases fuel consumption. Thirdly, insurers, have triple their costs. For the end client, the result is the same — a sharp jump in the final cost.

According to market estimates, maritime rates over the last month grew by 35%, and the price of transport from the Middle East countries has already increased 1.7 times compared to February. In a number of cases, the dispatch of just one TEU doubled, and in others, by 20–40%. It is also important to note how quickly this happened – price increases unfolded within 48–72 hours after the start of the Iran war on 28 February. That is not a sign not of a smooth correction, but of a panic.

Aviation could become a natural replacement for the sea for part of the critical cargo. But the Russian logistics operators face a new difficulty. Russian and Belarusian airlines are not flying to the Emirates until the end of March at the earliest, and the removal of cargo is possible only by local carriers. For this, a MOFA certificate is needed — a permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the export of cargo to Russia. Obtaining it takes from 3 to 15 working days. That means that the scheme itself becomes not only more expensive, but also administratively longer. Planned exports of products such as fresh lobsters and seafood will be not just written off but could present health hazards.

Aviation

In the air, the situation is also complicated. The closure of the sky from Iran to Israel and the suspension of flights by large regional cargo players sharply reduce available capacities. International carriers such as British Airways and Cathay Pacific have suspended all services to Dubai until May, when the situation will be reviewed.

According to Freightos, in the first week of the Iran conflict, air cargo rates from Southeast Asia to Europe grew by more than 6%, from South Asia to Europe — by 3%, from South Asia to the USA — by 5%, from the Middle East to Europe — by 8%, and from China to the USA — by 15%. Against this background, forwarders are already beginning to charter direct flights from Asia to Europe to compensate for the lost capacity. This also pushes rates up.

Impact on the INSTC

This has also impacted the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) the multi-modal route between Russia and South Asia. From 28 February, the transit of goods between Russia, India, Iran, and neighbouring countries has been suspended. For logistics, this is critical: the corridor combined rail, road, sea, and river routes and was viewed as one of the key alternative channels of communication with South Asia and the Middle East.

In a normal situation, import-export markets typically compensate for the loss of one route at the expense of another. Today, this is no longer the case. The closure of the North-South corridor overlaps with the disruption in the Persian Gulf and problems with aviation. This turns the crisis from linear — when a specific route becomes more expensive — into network-based, when all bypass options are overloaded at once. For Russian importers, this means not just a rate increase, but a decrease in the manageability of the entire chain.

In response to this, logisticians use combined solutions. Cargo is collected by truck from Dubai, taken to Oman, and then sent by aircraft through third countries — for example, through Turkiye or India — with subsequent connection to Russia. Small shipments can still be carried by passenger flights, but with bulky cargo, the situation is much more complicated with having to wait for a suitable aircraft or a dispatch window. Even where the chain formally remains, it becomes slower, more complex, and more expensive.

Geographic Risk

Another risk concerns geography. While the ports of Sohar and Salalah in Oman operate relatively normally, the situation is significantly worse for a number of Gulf countries. The operation of most ports in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are suspended. The most difficult position is for Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, for which the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively the only exit to the world ocean.

The current crisis overlapped with the already existing tightening of import conditions. In February 2026, the Russian import-export administrator, Rosakkreditatsiya suspended the recognition of documents from certification bodies of Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, through which importers processed part of the declarations and certificates of conformity for supplies to Russia. For grey and parallel import, this meant additional administrative complexity.

The Iran conflict means that a physical contraction of the main logistical hub has been added to the regulatory pressure. It is this combination that makes the situation especially difficult for the mass market. When the route becomes more expensive and the certification part becomes simultaneously more complicated, the segment loses the advantage on which it rested: relative flexibility and speed. For the consumer, this will likely mean not the disappearance of the product, but noticeable price increases.

Where Will Russian Consumers Be Hit?

Russian market analysts indicate that the most sensitive categories will be car parts for brands that left the Russian market, and mass segment clothing. This is logical because both categories use parallel and alternative channels through the UAE. Secondly, price sensitivity is high, even a moderate growth of the logistical and insurance component quickly turns into a noticeable jump in the final price.

This suggests that if the conflict lasts for several months, some imported goods in Russia may rise in price by 15–25%. In a practical sense, this means that consumer pressure will be felt fastest exactly by those segments where the Russian market already partially depended on alternative supply chains, and competition within the category does not compensate for the growth of cost. Car parts are especially vulnerable here: for some brands, there are simply few alternative mass channels. If considering a car purchase, the sensible option would be to ensure parts are easily available.

Supply Chain Consequences

For importers, the main conclusion is that the UAE can no longer be considered an unconditionally reliable transit solution. Even if part of the flows is preserved through Oman or other bypass hubs, the very logic of supply changes: instead of one large centre, a more complex network of routes with a larger number of intermediate legs will have to be built, in some cases from scratch. This means an increase in requirements for planning, stocks, documentary support, and financial stability of the supply routes.

For logistical operators, the Middle East crisis is a test of their ability to quickly reassemble corridors. Manufacturers and consumers need not just alternatives, but the building of an economy of delivery in a situation where fuel, insurance, air capacity, and maritime transit are all becoming more expensive. In such a market, competitive advantage is increasingly determined not by the base rate, but by the quality of scenario management of the route.

For retail and distribution, the consequences are also direct. The growth of delivery cost and the lengthening of supply chain routes inevitably mean a revision of purchasing policy, safety stock, and assortment models. In categories with Russia’s high dependence on parallel imports, this may lead to an accelerated revision of prices and more cautious work with balances.

Market participants believe that part of the flows will be preserved through China and other channels. But goods that went through the UAE will almost certainly become more expensive. Because the crisis has affected several elements of the system at once: the Persian Gulf seaports, the aviation sector, financial costs such as insurance, and the International North-South Transport Corridor, this makes the simple replacement of one route with another practically impossible.

The Middle East crisis has become for Russian logistics an example of how quickly geopolitical risk turns into consumer inflation. The Iran conflict impacts not just one route, but the entire transit system of Russia being tied to the UAE as a hub for parallel import has come under attack. For business, this means a transition from habitual rate optimisation to management of physical availability of the corridor. For the consumer — a probable price increase for spare parts, mass market clothing, and other imported categories. And for the market as a whole — this serves as another reminder that the stability of supply in 2026 is more important than the nominal cost of transport.

[Ravenlocke]

Russia's Pivot to Asia

Mar 20
Russian To Be Taught As A Primary Foreign Language In Cuba

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...guage-in-cuba/
Russian is to be taught as the primary second language after Cuban Spanish in Cuba to better prepare students for engagement with Russian tourists and further Russian education possibilities in the country. It is one of several nations enaging more with Russian language to encourage trade, tourism and investment ties.

https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/2034963532647997620

https://russiaspivottoasia.com/russi...guage-in-cuba/

Russian To Be Taught As A Primary Foreign Language In Cuba

Published on March 20, 2026
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Russian will be taught at Cuban schools as the first foreign language from the 2026-2027 academic year, the Russian Education Ministry has stated.

The Russian-Cuban working group for cooperation on general, vocational, and additional vocational education and organizing children’s rest and recovery held its third meeting in Moscow on Thursday (March 19), with the Ministry saying that “the discussion focused on teaching Russian in Cuba. The sides agreed to include Russian in the curriculum of Cuban schools as the first foreign language from the 2026/27 school year.

The two sides also agreed to develop cooperation in areas such as vocational education, share experiences in working with children with disabilities, and their endeavors in the digitization sphere. Several countries are introducing Russian language classes, mainly to assist with developing the Russian tourism market. Russian visitors now spend more currency overseas than Europeans do, mainly due to a higher level of disposable income.